마음의 경계, - 부속 외재주의(HEMC) 비판 그리고 구현주의를 위한 변론 -
Bound of Mind/Cognition, - A Critique of the Hypothesis of Embedded Mind/Cognition for a Plea for the Inclusive Externalism -
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마음/인지가 유기체의 내면이나 뇌 안에서 일어나는 것으로 보는 데카르트 전통의 마음이론에 근래 들어 외재주의가 도전장을 내밀고 있다. 마음/인지의 해명 작업에 뇌 너머 (신체, 상황 등을 아우르는) 환경까지 고려해야 한다는 것이다. 다만 외재주의의 종류들은 다양하다. 그중에서 내재주의와 외재주의를 중재한다고 하는 부속인지 테제의 구체적 모델로 대량모듈 가설 혹은 진화심리학이 최근 부상하면서 부속인지 테제가 입지를 확장하고 있다. 필자는 부속인지 테제 및 대량모듈 가설에 대해 다소 거리를 두는 입장이다. 필자의 생각으로는, 부속인지 테제 및 대량모듈 가설에 문제가 있기 때문이다. 다른 무엇보다도 인지개념의 비정합성, 모듈개념의 자기 모순성 그리고 인지에 관한 제한된 설명력 등이 언급될 수 있다. 필자가 선호하는 대안은 포괄적 마음 설명 모델이다. 이 대안에서 마음 ‘기제’는, 부속인지 및 대량모듈 가설과 달리, 두뇌 너머 환경에까지 뻗친 것으로 이해된다.
Abstract
The tradition of Descartes' theory of mind / cognition says that mind / cognition occurs within the inner world of the brain. Recently a new trend i.e. externalism appears. This externalism claims that the environment which lies outside the brain, must be included / counted to the explanation of the mind / cognition. Yet different types of externalism exist. The HEMC (hypothesis of embedded cognition), which is one of them, turns out to be a theory that reconciles the internalist and externalist views of the mind / cognition. While the hypothesis of massive modularity (or evolutionary psychology) emerges as a concrete scientific model of HEMC, with it this expands meanwhile his explanatory power base. My opinion on the question of whether HEMC and the hypothesis of massive modularity explain the mind good or not, is not a optimistic one. They are not without problems. Among several other problems can be mentioned especially the problem of the phenomenalistic approach to the mind / cognition, the self-conflict problem of the module concept and the limited explanational power of the representationalism. In contrast to those two theses I propose an alternative research program, i.e. an integrative / inclusive externalism, which contatins an alternative mind / concept and a re-use model of cognitive mechanism. This proposal argues that the boundary of the cognitive mechanism, in contrast to the hypothesis HEMC and the massive modularity, is not restricted to the brain, but extends to the environment.
참고문헌 (28)
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