자연주의와 규범성 문제

Abstract

Since W. V. Quine’s 1969 essay “Epistemology Naturalized”, naturalism has formed a big trend or wave in epistemology. However, there are critics as many as advocates of naturalistic approach to epistemology. One of the most important objections raised against naturalism is called “the normativity objection.” According to this objection, naturalized epistemology cannot account for essential character of epistemology. So, it is often accused of ruling out the normative element, so characteristic of epistemology. Critics maintain that naturalized epistemology is an impossible project since epistemology is a normative discipline, and a scientific discipline cannot be normative. They treat Quine’s proposal to make epistemology a “chapter of psychology” as a proposal for abandoning normative epistemology. Therefore, they conclude that naturalized epistemology is not genuine epistemology. On the contrary, naturalists deny that naturalized is not genuine epistemology. They maintain that naturalized epistemology can preserve the normative characteristic of epistemology, and so it does not abandon epistemology. The main aim of this paper is to investigate what becomes of normativity in naturalized epistemology. I investigate whether naturalism can be pursued as normative project, or it is a merely descriptive project. Then, I introduce Quine’s assertion that naturalized epistemology still can be normative in new settings, and examine what becomes this normativity in Quine’s sense. I maintain that “normativity” in naturalized epistemology is different from normativity in traditional epistemology, and point out that naturalized epistemology has a instrumental normativity. Finally, I conclude that even if naturalized epistemology has a kind of normativity, it has a limited sense, or a characteristic of disguised empirical statements.