What Happened Sixty Years Ago?: ROK-US Deep Distrust between President Rhee and Eisenhower
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Many letters were sent between President Rhee Syng-Man and President Dwight Eisenhower before and after the release of anti-communist POWs which was unilaterally ordered by Rhee. According to these letters, President Rhee intended to use the release as a means to disturb the armistice and Ike was furious to the point of devising another plan to replace leadership in South Korea. According to the letters, the conflict between the two leaders was much more serious than it had been already assessed by scholars. Furthermore, Rhee's "March North for Unification" was another controversial issue after the armistice. It was closely related to the political conference which was a critical provision of the Armistice Agreement. The conference was to be held three months after the armistice was signed. Rhee refused to attend the conference and wished to implement his policy in case the conference failed, whereas the US government strongly opposed any military reaction against the communists. The controversy continued until the end of the Rhee administration. What caused these serious conflicts at the critical moment between two countries that in the end signed a mutual security pact? According to the letters, the cause mainly stemmed from Rhee's hawkish policy which rejected any peaceful solution of the Korean problem. However, this is a reflection of Rhee’s disappointment not only at the change in the war policy of the UN and the US, but also at the vague comments by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles about Rhee’s request.
Abstract
Many letters were sent between President Rhee Syng-Man and President Dwight Eisenhower before and after the release of anti-communist POWs which was unilaterally ordered by Rhee. According to these letters, President Rhee intended to use the release as a means to disturb the armistice and Ike was furious to the point of devising another plan to replace leadership in South Korea. According to the letters, the conflict between the two leaders was much more serious than it had been already assessed by scholars. Furthermore, Rhee's "March North for Unification" was another controversial issue after the armistice. It was closely related to the political conference which was a critical provision of the Armistice Agreement. The conference was to be held three months after the armistice was signed. Rhee refused to attend the conference and wished to implement his policy in case the conference failed, whereas the US government strongly opposed any military reaction against the communists. The controversy continued until the end of the Rhee administration. What caused these serious conflicts at the critical moment between two countries that in the end signed a mutual security pact? According to the letters, the cause mainly stemmed from Rhee's hawkish policy which rejected any peaceful solution of the Korean problem. However, this is a reflection of Rhee’s disappointment not only at the change in the war policy of the UN and the US, but also at the vague comments by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles about Rhee’s request.
참고문헌 (16)
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