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Extended-Deterrent Effect of Russia and Its Implications for the U.S.-N. Korean Nuclear Negotiation

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국제학연구소 (The Keimyung Institute for International Studies)|2020.12|Journal of International and Area Studies|제27권 제2호|pp. 113-134|DOI 10.23071/jias.2020.27.2.113

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키워드

Nuclear weaponsExtended deterrence of Russianuclear N. KoreaU.S. nuclear negotiationsdisputes.
주제분류정치외교학

초록

This paper aims to examine whether extended deterrence of Russia over its military allies or trading partners is credible. I argue that alliance commitments of Russia’s autocratic leaders with ambivalent deterrence policy are unlikely to deter foreign aggressions. Through the multinomial logit analysis, I have found that there is little evidence that countries that formed military alliances or trade linkages with Russia are likely to increase deterrence success. Rather than hindering disputes, Russia’s military alliances are likely to engage in disputes, and more likely in war. Russia’s trading linkages have no discernible effect on disputes. These findings imply that faced with the lack of credible alliance, N. Korea could be driven into a hands-tied paradox. To escape this dilemma, the U.S. seems more likely to accept the practical goal, the reduction of the direct N. Korea’s threat which may bring about the cold peace in Northeast Asia.

Abstract

This paper aims to examine whether extended deterrence of Russia over its military allies or trading partners is credible. I argue that alliance commitments of Russia’s autocratic leaders with ambivalent deterrence policy are unlikely to deter foreign aggressions. Through the multinomial logit analysis, I have found that there is little evidence that countries that formed military alliances or trade linkages with Russia are likely to increase deterrence success. Rather than hindering disputes, Russia’s military alliances are likely to engage in disputes, and more likely in war. Russia’s trading linkages have no discernible effect on disputes. These findings imply that faced with the lack of credible alliance, N. Korea could be driven into a hands-tied paradox. To escape this dilemma, the U.S. seems more likely to accept the practical goal, the reduction of the direct N. Korea’s threat which may bring about the cold peace in Northeast Asia.

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