Assessing the Effectiveness of Security Assurances on the DPRK’s Nuclear Issue
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In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s case of nuclear proliferation, less attention has been paid to the role of security assurances. This paper seeks to assess the role of security assurances for the DPRK provided by the UN, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States and to figure out why these assurances are less effective to bridle its nuclear ambition. It argues that an effective security assurance for nuclear non-proliferation should meet at least two conditions. Firstly the security assurance should be credible, which can be realized by being publicized, legally binding, and infusing with further commitments. Secondly, the security assurance tailored to the unique features of the target state’s concerns is more likely to be effective. Using this set of criteria, the only moderately effective assurance is that provided by the Soviet Union. The general security assurance of the UN is neither legally binding nor specifically targeted. The alliance with China exists only on paper as Pyongyang believes Beijing is reluctant to fulll its obligation as an ally. The United States is taking a capricious attitude on the DPRK and none of its security assurances are legalized or address its major concern of regime survival. These may help explain why security assurances failed to prevent the DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Abstract
In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s case of nuclear proliferation, less attention has been paid to the role of security assurances. This paper seeks to assess the role of security assurances for the DPRK provided by the UN, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States and to figure out why these assurances are less effective to bridle its nuclear ambition. It argues that an effective security assurance for nuclear non-proliferation should meet at least two conditions. Firstly the security assurance should be credible, which can be realized by being publicized, legally binding, and infusing with further commitments. Secondly, the security assurance tailored to the unique features of the target state’s concerns is more likely to be effective. Using this set of criteria, the only moderately effective assurance is that provided by the Soviet Union. The general security assurance of the UN is neither legally binding nor specifically targeted. The alliance with China exists only on paper as Pyongyang believes Beijing is reluctant to fulll its obligation as an ally. The United States is taking a capricious attitude on the DPRK and none of its security assurances are legalized or address its major concern of regime survival. These may help explain why security assurances failed to prevent the DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons.
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