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기업지배구조 이론에 관한 소고

Reflections on Corporate Governance Theory

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주제분류법학

초록

필자는 회사법을 공부하면서 계속해서 “주식회사의 주인은 누구인가?”라는 의문에 직면했다. 주주 중심의 관념이 깊게 뿌리박혀 있음에도 불구하고 이를 그대로 적용하면 개인적으로 해결되지 않는 문제들이 많았기 때문이다. 필자는 이미 이전 논문에서 주주는 주식회사의 이해관계자 중 하나에 불과하다고 주장했으며 주식회사의 주인은 주식회사 자체라고 주장했다. 그러나 최근에 주주 중심 이론의 본거지라 할 수 있는 미국에서조차 이해관계자 모델이나 팀 프로덕션 모델과 같이 다양한 이론들이 등장하면서 주주 중심 이론이 크게 흔들리고 있는 양상이다. 따라서 필자는 주식회사의 주인이 누구인지에 대한 논리를 더욱 정밀하게 다듬고, 기업지배구조 이론의 새로운 동향을 살펴볼 필요가 있다는 결론에 이르게 되었다. 법학이 실천적 학문임을 내세워 법의 기초와 이데올로기 문제를 경시할 수도 있겠지만, 기업지배구조와 관련된 모든 법률 조항은 강력한 사상적 기초를 지닌다는 점을 염두에 두어야 한다. 주주 중심주의라는 사상은 이미 세계적인 흐름 속에서 전통적인 이론으로 여겨지고 있다. 주식회사의 사회적 책임이나 주주 유한책임의 원칙과 같은 문제들은 주주 중심 이론에서는 설명하기 어려운 것들이며, 회사의 주인이 누구인지에 대한 논의는 기업지배구조 이론을 이해하는 데 핵심적인 문제로 다가올 것이라고 본다. 경영진이나 이사회가 누구의 이익을 위해 일해야 하는지와 직접적으로 연결되는 문제이기 때문이다. OECD 원칙이나 세계 학계의 흐름은 이제 기업의 구성원 중 어느 한 구성원만을 중요하게 여기던 지난 시대와 작별을 고하고 있는 것으로 보인다. 주주 역시 기업의 이해관계자이지만 물적회사인 주식회사에 가장 중요한 자본적 기초를 제공한 대가로 의결권이라는 배타적 주주 프랜차이즈, 즉 주주특권을 부여받고 있지만, 독일의 경우처럼 우리나라에서도 그들이 종업원과 그 특권을 공유할 날이 올지도 모른다.

Abstract

While studying corporate law, I continued to face the question of "Who is the owner of a corporation?" This is because despite the deep-rooted shareholder primacy theory, there were many problems that could not be solved personally if applied as it is. In previous papers, I have already argued that shareholders are only one of the stakeholders of a stock company, and that the owner of a corporation is the corporation itself. Recently, however, as various theories, such as stakeholder model and team production model, have emerged even in the United States, which is the home of the shareholder primacy theory, the shareholder primacy theory has been greatly shaken. Therefore, I came to the conclusion that it was necessary to more precisely refine the logic of who the owner of a corporation was and examine new trends in the theory of corporate governance. While it is possible to belittle the basic and ideological issues of law by claiming that law is a practical study, it should be borne in mind that all legal provisions related to corporate governance have a strong ideological basis. The idea of shareholder primacy theory is already regarded as a traditional theory in the global trend. Issues such as the social responsibility of a stock company and the principle of limited shareholder liability are difficult to explain in the shareholder primacy theory, and discussions on who the owner of the corporation is expected to be a key issue in understanding the theory of corporate governance. This is because it is a matter that is directly connected to whose interests the management or the board should work for. The OECD principles and the trend of the world academia now seem to be saying goodbye to the past era when only one of the members of a company was considered important. Shareholders are also stakeholders of the company, but are granted an exclusive shareholder franchise, or shareholder privilege, in exchange for providing the most important capital foundation to a corporation, which is a physical company, but the day may come when they share that privilege with their employees in Korea, as in the case of Germany.

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