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매디의 수학적 자연주의의 존재론적 퇴보

Ontological Regress of Maddy's Mathematical Naturalism

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주제분류철학

초록

이 논문은 매디가 왜 수학적 실재론을 포기하고 그녀 특유의 수학적 자연주의를 표방하게 되었는지를 탐구하려 한다. 이 문제에 관하여 널리 받아들여지고 있는 한 가설에 따르면, 매디의 입장 변화는 콰인-퍼트남 필수불가결성 논증을 비판하고 포기함으로써 야기되었다. 필자는 이 가설이 지닌 설득력을 인정하지만, 그것만으로는 실재론의 포기의 충분한 이유가 될 수 없다고 생각하며, 그 대신 과학과 수학의 유비 문제가 매디의 입장 변화를 이해하는 데 더 나은 조망을 제공한다는 점을 보여주고자 한다. 이를 위해서는 콰인과 괴델에 크게 빚졌던 실재론자 시절 매디의 사유가 얼마만큼 수학과 과학의 유비에 지배되었는지를 살펴보아야 하는 동시에, 왜 매디가 이 유비를 포기함으로써 실재론을 포기하게 되는지를 이해하여야 한다. 아울러 이 유비의 포기에 대한 다소의 비판적 검토를 통해 매디의 수학적 존재론의 지적 여정을 왜 필자가 존재론적 퇴보라 믿는지에 대한 몇 가지 이유가 시사될 것이다.

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to probe the question as to why Maddy gave up mathematical realism and moved to her own version of mathematical naturalism. According to one widespread hypothesis, Maddy’s change of mind was brought up by her criticism of Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. Though quite convincing, it is not good enough to explain why one has to give up mathematical realism. The analogy of science and mathematics will instead be shown to be the better perspective to fathom Maddy’s changing beliefs. For this purpose, we have to understand to what extent Maddy's thought in her realist years, which was strongly influenced by Quine and Goedel, was governed by the analogy of science and mathematics. Also, we have to understand why Maddy gave up the analogy, and thereby gave up mathematical realism. Finally, some criticisms against Maddy's abandonment of the analogy will be examined so as to hint at reasons why I believe Maddy's intellectual journey in mathematical ontology is rather regress than progress.

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