On Nominalist Paraphrase
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This paper is about the problems that Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment creates for Nominalists. Quine’s clear criterion of ontological commitment, summarized as “to be is to be the value of a variable”, means that when we accept a sentence to be true, we are committed to the existence of things that must exist for the sentence to be true. The criterion causes problems for Nominalists. According to Quine’s criterion, Nominalists who consider “Humility is a virtue” as true should accept the existence of the property, humility. However, Nominalists are reluctant to accept that properties such as humility exist, although they wish to accept what is meant by “humility is a virtue”. The way out of this predicament is presenting a paraphrase which delivers what Nominalists wanted to say through the original sentence without ontological commitment to the property. Several attempts were made to paraphrase such sentences, only to fail. In this paper, successful paraphrases will be presented to cope with previously discussed difficulties. Beforehand, several issues involved in the Quine's criterion will be clarified. Also, Lewis’s critical objection that we should give up the business of paraphrase will be discussed.
Abstract
This paper is about the problems that Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment creates for Nominalists. Quine’s clear criterion of ontological commitment, summarized as “to be is to be the value of a variable”, means that when we accept a sentence to be true, we are committed to the existence of things that must exist for the sentence to be true. The criterion causes problems for Nominalists. According to Quine’s criterion, Nominalists who consider “Humility is a virtue” as true should accept the existence of the property, humility. However, Nominalists are reluctant to accept that properties such as humility exist, although they wish to accept what is meant by “humility is a virtue”. The way out of this predicament is presenting a paraphrase which delivers what Nominalists wanted to say through the original sentence without ontological commitment to the property. Several attempts were made to paraphrase such sentences, only to fail. In this paper, successful paraphrases will be presented to cope with previously discussed difficulties. Beforehand, several issues involved in the Quine's criterion will be clarified. Also, Lewis’s critical objection that we should give up the business of paraphrase will be discussed.
참고문헌 (15)
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