탐구와 인식적 합리성
Inquiry and Epistemic Rationality
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초록
인식적 합리성은 전적으로 진리 연관성의 문제라는 것이 인식론의 정설이다. 이글은 이런 정설을 비판하여, 주제의 인식적 가치가 탐구 및 믿음의 인식적 합리성에 영향을 미친다고 주장한다. 구체적으로, 이 글은 한 탐구가 알 가치가 없는 주제와 관련될 때 인식적으로 불합리하다고 주장하며, 그 탐구의 결과로 나타나는 믿음도 인식적으로 불합리하다고 주장한다.
Abstract
It is an orthodox in epistemology that only those things that affect the truth conduciveness of a belief are relevant to the epistemic rationality of the belief. I criticize this orthodox. In this paper, I claim that the epistemic worth of a subject affects the epistemic rationality of inquiries and resulting beliefs. More specifically, I argue that it is epistemically irrational to conduct an inquiry when it is about something unworthy of knowing, and that the epistemic irrationality of an inquiry in this sense makes the resulting beliefs epistemically irrational. After presenting my argument, I defend it from various possible criticisms. Then I explicate the implications of my argument that opposes the core assumptions of contemporary epistemology.
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