아크라시아와 강제

Abstract

This papar aims to suggest the reasonable criteria for distinguishing between akrasia and compulsion. For this purpose, I first discuss the common account for distinguishing akrasia from compulsion, Watson’s alternative account, and the critical accounts after Watson. Based on this analysis, I suggest the multicriteria for distinguishing between akrasia and compulsion as follows. (1) Akrasia involves the failure to develop certain normal capacities of self-control, whereas compulsion involves desires which even the possession of such capacities would not enable one to resist. (2) In cases of compulsion, the compelled agent lacks the rational capacity to bring her desires into line with her belief what she ought to do, whereas in cases of akrasia she has that capacity, although she does not exercise it. (3) A weak-willed agent has inner motivational conflict before she does an akratic action, whereas a compelled agent generally does not have such a kind of inner motivational conflict before she does a compelled action. Besides, regret and shame will often be appropriate in the case of akrasia in a way in which it will not be for compulsion. Finally, a weak-willed agent is responsible for her akratic action because a akratic action is blameworthy, whereas a compelled agent is not responsible for her compelled action because a compelled action is not blameworthy.