칸트 윤리학에서 도덕 감정의 문제와 도덕 교육적 시사점 - 비판기와 비판기 이후 관점의 변화를 중심으로 -

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to investigate the status of moral emotions in Kant's ethics, focusing on the differences in perspectives after the critical period and the critical period. This was to address the positions of moral emotions in the two periods in an integrated manner, correct misunderstandings that may arise from thinking that Kant did not recognize them, and to confirm that certain moral emotions, such as feelings of pleasure and discomfort, empathy and compassion, may be indirect obligations. To this end, this study focused on the differences in moral emotions that appeared in Kant's writings during and after the critical period. In other words, it was confirmed that moral emotions in the writings of the critical period focused on the emotions that rational and emotional beings had in recognizing their obligations and recognized only respect, while moral emotions mainly focused on feelings of pleasure and argued that the cultivation of certain emotions, such as empathy and sympathy, was one of our moral obligations in the writings after the critical period. And based on the results of this review, the implications of Kant's moral education, focusing on respect and moral pleasure, were examined.