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미합중국헌법의 ‘수권조항(Vesting Clause)’ : 그 이론적 배경(권력분립원리)과 역사적 기원을 중심으로

The Vesting Clauses in the U.S. Constitution : Ideological Backgrounds and Historical Origins

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이 논문은 미합중국헌법의 수권조항, 즉 입법권·집행권·사법권 수권조항의 역사적기원을 필라델피아 제헌회의에서 논의된 기록을 통해 규명한 것이다. 아울러 그 수권조항의 이론적 배경이 되는 권력분립원리가 건국·제헌 당시에 수용되는 초기 헌법사에 대해서도 살펴보았다. 애당초 권력분립원리는 정부의 기능을 입법권·집행권·사법권으로 분리하여 이를 각기 다른 기관에 귀속시킨다는 순수한 의미로 받아들여졌으나, 필라델피아 제헌회의에서의 복잡한 정치적 타협의 과정에서, 권력 상호간 견제와균형이라는 18세기 영국 정치이론의 논리까지 불가분적으로 추가되었다. 권력분립원리를 조문화한 미합중국헌법의 수권조항에도, 중앙집권과 지방분권을 둘러싼 정치적이해관계의 대립 가운데, 상대편의 권력(주로 의회의 입법권)을 견제하여 권력의 균형을 이루려는 현실적 동기가 반영되어 있다. 즉, 미합중국헌법의 수권조항은 입법·집행·사법의 ‘기능적’ 권력분립보다, 중앙과 지방의 ‘수직적’ 견제·균형에 그 주된 입헌의도가 놓여 있었다.

Abstract

No part of a modern constitution is more similar to the U.S. Constitution than its “vesting clauses,” and the current Korean Constitution is not an exception. In this Article, I traced the historic origins of three (legislative, executive and judicial) “vesting clauses” in the U.S. Constitution back to the debates in the Federal Convention of 1787. As an ideological background of the “vesting clauses,” I also examined the acceptance of the principle of “separation of powers” in the early stage of the U.S. constitutional history. The “pure doctrine” of the separation of powers, which empathized the clear division of government responsibilities into two (legislative and executive, as in Britain) or three (legislative, executive and judicial, as in the U.S.) distinct functions and organs, prevailed during or just after the American Revolution, as was under the Instrument of Government following the English Civil War. However, in the course of repeated compromises between broad nationalists and state-federalists during the debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, the concept of “checks and balances,” which had its origins in the British political theory of “mixed government” or of the “balanced constitution” in the 18th century, overwhelmed the “simple separation” of functions and organs. Therefore, the newly integrated principle of “separation of powers” was expanded to include the aristocratic idea of “checks and balances” between branches of government. The “vesting clauses” in the U.S. Constitution particularly reflected the complicatedpolitical compromises between antagonistic interests of delegates from different states. The “legislative” vesting clause was more enumerative, despite some general provisions, than other vesting clauses, which meant that the Founding Fathers concentrated their efforts on elaborating the vertical distribution of legislative powers between the national and state governments. In contrast, the “executive” vesting clause was written in more general terms than the legislative one, and the “judicial” vesting clause was written in the most general terms of all. In the last two vesting clauses, the Founding Fathers intended to broaden the “national” powers of the executive and of the judiciary against the “regionally-represented” federal congress. The “vesting clauses” hereby provided the “vertical” checks and balances, rather than the “functional” separation of powers.

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