러시아 중앙은행의 독립성 연구
A Study on the Independence of Central Bank of Russia
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초록
러시아 중앙은행의 독립성에 관하여 법적인 측면과 정치적 측면을 중심으로 분석하였다. 법적인 측면은 러시아 헌법과 중앙은행에 관한 연방법률을 중심으로 분석하였으며 정치적 측면은 주로 중앙은행 총재의 이직율과 정치적 변동 즉 수상 교체 등에 따른 중앙은행 총재의 변동을 중심으로 분석하였다. 러시아 중앙은행의 법적인 독립성은 적어도 어느 선진국 못지않게 잘 정비되어 있다고 분석되었다. 이와 같은 법적인 독립성의 결과는 정치적 취약성 측면에서 어느 정도 보완되었다고 보여 진다. 즉 중앙은행 총재의 이직지수의 분석에 의하면 옐친시기에는 다른 국가들의 경우와 비교하여 볼 때 상당히 높은 이직지수를 보여주고 있었다. 이는 러시아 중앙은행이 법적인 독립성을 유지한다고 하더라도 정치적으로 영향을 받았음을 보여주고 있는 것이다.
Abstract
The independence of CBR was analyzed based on the legal and political aspects. The legal aspects mainly came from the Russian Constitution and the Federal Law on the CBR and the political aspects dealt with the turnover rate of the CBR governor and the political vulnerability of CBR. The main findings are as follows: the legal independence of CBR are well supported in contrast to the most industrialized countries. These results may be supplemented with the analysis of a political vulnerability of CBR. That is, during the Yeltsin period, the turnover rate of CBR governor was relatively very high by contrast with other countries analyzed. It means that although CBR kept the legal independence, it was affected by the political situations. Nevertheless, both the turnover rate of CBR governor and the political vulnerability index seems to be not so high in contrast to the industrialized advanced countries as well as the developing countries. These results showed that the CBR maintained its independence both legally and politically in contrast to other countries.
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