Can a Brain Possess Two Minds?
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In “A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition” David Chalmers articulates, justifies and defends the computational suf ficiency thesis (CST). Chalmers advances a revised theory of computational implementation, and argues that implementing the right sort of computational structure is sufficient for the possession of a mind, and for the possession of a wide variety of mental properties. I argue that Chalmers’s theory of implementation is consistent with the nomological possibility of physical systems that possess different entire minds. I further argue that this brain-possessing-two-minds result challenges CST in three ways. It implicates CST with a host of epistemological problems;it undermines the underlying assumption that the mental supervenes on the physical; and it calls into question the claim that CST provides conceptual foundations for the computational science of the mind.
Abstract
In “A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition” David Chalmers articulates, justifies and defends the computational suf ficiency thesis (CST). Chalmers advances a revised theory of computational implementation, and argues that implementing the right sort of computational structure is sufficient for the possession of a mind, and for the possession of a wide variety of mental properties. I argue that Chalmers’s theory of implementation is consistent with the nomological possibility of physical systems that possess different entire minds. I further argue that this brain-possessing-two-minds result challenges CST in three ways. It implicates CST with a host of epistemological problems;it undermines the underlying assumption that the mental supervenes on the physical; and it calls into question the claim that CST provides conceptual foundations for the computational science of the mind.
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