Chalmers on Implementation and Computational Sufficiency
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Chalmers (2011) argues for the following two principles: computational sufficiency and computational explanation. In this commentary I present two criticisms of Chalmers’ argument for the principle of computational sufficiency, which states that implementing the appropriate kind of computational structure suffices for possessing mentality. First, Chalmers establishes the existence of such groupings only in the trivial sense that any physical system can be described computationally to some arbitrary level of detail; further argumentation is required to show that the causal topology relevant to possessing a mind actually implements computations. Second, Chalmers’ account rules out plausible cases of implementation due to its requirement of an isomorphism between the state-types of a computation and the physical system implementing the computation.
Abstract
Chalmers (2011) argues for the following two principles: computational sufficiency and computational explanation. In this commentary I present two criticisms of Chalmers’ argument for the principle of computational sufficiency, which states that implementing the appropriate kind of computational structure suffices for possessing mentality. First, Chalmers establishes the existence of such groupings only in the trivial sense that any physical system can be described computationally to some arbitrary level of detail; further argumentation is required to show that the causal topology relevant to possessing a mind actually implements computations. Second, Chalmers’ account rules out plausible cases of implementation due to its requirement of an isomorphism between the state-types of a computation and the physical system implementing the computation.
참고문헌 (15)
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