Can we Prove that there are Computational Correlates of Consciousness in the Brain?
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Scientific research on consciousness is attempting to gather data aboutthe relationship between consciousness and the physical world. The basicprocedure is to measure consciousness through first-person reports, measure thephysical world and look for correlations between these sets of measurements. While most of this work has focused on neural correlates of consciousness, ithas also been proposed that consciousness is linked to the computations thatare being executed by the brain. If this is the case, we would expect there tobe a high level of correlation between some of the brain’s computations andconsciousness. This could be scientifically tested if a plausible method formeasuring computations could be found. This paper investigates whether Chalmers’ method for identifyingcomputations could be used to measure computations during an experimenton the correlates of consciousness. A number of arguments are used to showthat Chalmers’ account of implementation fails for a desktop computer, whichmakes it unlikely that it could be used to identify computational correlates ofconsciousness in the brain. While a different account of implementation mightbe able to rescue computational approaches to consciousness, the problemsraised in this paper suggest that it is going to be difficult to develop a methodfor measuring computations that could be used to test whether there arecomputational correlates of consciousness in the brain.
Abstract
Scientific research on consciousness is attempting to gather data aboutthe relationship between consciousness and the physical world. The basicprocedure is to measure consciousness through first-person reports, measure thephysical world and look for correlations between these sets of measurements. While most of this work has focused on neural correlates of consciousness, ithas also been proposed that consciousness is linked to the computations thatare being executed by the brain. If this is the case, we would expect there tobe a high level of correlation between some of the brain’s computations andconsciousness. This could be scientifically tested if a plausible method formeasuring computations could be found. This paper investigates whether Chalmers’ method for identifyingcomputations could be used to measure computations during an experimenton the correlates of consciousness. A number of arguments are used to showthat Chalmers’ account of implementation fails for a desktop computer, whichmakes it unlikely that it could be used to identify computational correlates ofconsciousness in the brain. While a different account of implementation mightbe able to rescue computational approaches to consciousness, the problemsraised in this paper suggest that it is going to be difficult to develop a methodfor measuring computations that could be used to test whether there arecomputational correlates of consciousness in the brain.
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