행정전자서명 암호체계 기술 현황 분석 및 고도화 방향
Analysis of the Cryptosystem of the Korean Government Public-Key Infrastructure and Ways to Improve It
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초록
행정전자서명(GPKI)은 대한민국 중앙정부, 지방정부, 공공기관 등이 자체행정과 대민서비스를 제공할 때 사용하는 공개키 기반구조로 정보시스템의 인증 및 보안 기능을 수행한다. 현재 행정전자서명에서 사용하는 암호체계는 2000년대 초반에 구축하였으며, 2010년에 한 차례 고도화를 진행한 후 10여 년이 지났다. 지난 10여 년간 암호를 포함하여 정보보안은 많은 변화를 겪어왔으며, 앞으로도 수많은 변화를 맞이하게 될 것이다. 따라서 행정전자서명의 지속 가능한 안전성을 위해서는 현시점에서 암호체계의 안전성을 재검토할 필요가 있다. 이 논문은 행정전자서명 암호체계에 사용된 기술 및 표준의 현황과 안전성을 분석하여, 안전성이 저하된 암호알고리즘을 사용하거나, 폐지 또는 대체된 표준을 참고하는 사례와 안전성 상향을 위해 조정해야 할 파라미터 등을 식별하였다. 그리고 이를 바탕으로 행정전자서명 암호체계 고도화를 위한 암호알고리즘 및 관련 기술의 개편 방향을 제시한다.
Abstract
Korean Government-PKI (GPKI) is a public-key infrastructure which provides authentication and security functions for information system used by central government, local governments, and public institutions of the Republic of Korea to provide their own administrative and public services. The current cryptosystem of GPKI was established in the early 2000s, and more than ten years have passed since the last improvement in 2010. Over the past decade or so, the information security, including cryptography, has undergone many changes and will continue to face many changes. Therefore, for the sustainable security of GPKI, it is necessary to review the security of the cryptosystem at this point. In this paper, we analyze the current status and the security of technologies and standards used in the system. We identify cryptographic algorithms with degraded security, international standards which are obsoleted or updated, and cryptographic parameters that should be revised for the high security level. And based on this, we make several suggestions on the reorganization of cryptographic algorithms and related technologies for the security enhancement of GPKI.
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