주택임대차법상 실거주를 이유로 한 계약갱신거절권에 관한 소고 - 대법원 판결들을 중심으로 -

Abstract

This thesis is a subsequent study to the previous work, “A Study on the Actual Residence of the Lessor among the Grounds for Refusal of Renewal of Article 6-3 of the Housing Lease Protection Act.” In the previous paper, I analyzed lower court decisions regarding “actual residence of the lessor” as stipulated in Article 6-3(1)8 of the Housing Lease Protection Act and derived implications. Subsequently, Supreme Court decisions on this provision were issued, particularly the 2021da266631 decision and the 2022da213641 decision, which are significant as the first Supreme Court rulings related to the 2020 amended Housing Lease Protection Act that introduced the lessee’s right to request contract renewal and the lessor’s right to refuse renewal. In conclusion, I agree with the Supreme Court’s decisions. While lower court decisions were not unified, they tended to restrict the lessor’s property rights by ruling that neither the lessor nor the buyer could exercise the right to refuse renewal if the lessor sold the house and the buyer intended to actually reside in it. However, the Supreme Court held that the lessor could exercise the right to refuse renewal within the refusal period prescribed in the former part of Article 6(1) of the Housing Lease Protection Act, even if the grounds under subparagraph 8 arose after the lessee exercised their right to request renewal. Furthermore, the Court held that a person who acquires a leased property (including those who succeed to the right to lease) is considered to have assumed the position of the lessor by operation of law and could also exercise the right to refuse renewal within this period. I consider the Supreme Court’s expansion of the period for exercising the lessor’s right to refuse renewal to be appropriate. I also agree with the Supreme Court’s decision that the buyer can exercise the right to refuse renewal independently without succeeding the former lessor’s right. Article 3(4) of the Housing Lease Protection Act is not a comprehensive succession clause. As the buyer does not succeed all rights of the lessor, it is difficult to view the buyer as exercising the lessor’s right to refuse renewal through succession. However, these Supreme Court decisions dealt with cases where ownership was transferred and registered under the transferee’s name within the refusal period prescribed in the former part of Article 6(1) of the Housing Lease Protection Act. I anticipate that future Supreme Court decisions on cases where ownership changes to the buyer’s name after this refusal period will be noteworthy.