Xilinx SoC기반 고사양 제어보드의 부채널 취약점 분석
Side-Channel Vulnerability Analysis of Xilinx SoC-based High-Performance Control Board
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초록
무기체계는 데이터를 안전하게 보호하기 위해 암호화 기술이 필요하다. 이론적으로 안전한 암호 알고리즘도 암호 장비의 소비전력, 전자파 방사와 같은물리적 누출을 이용해 비밀키를 탈취하는 부채널 분석에 취약할 수 있다. 따라서안전한 보안 시스템을 구축하기 위해서는 부채널 분석 취약점을 식별하고대응기법을 적용해 암호를 구현해야 한다. 본 논문에서는 고사양 무인 차체제어보드에서 암호 알고리즘이 동작할 때 암호와 관련된 전자파가 방출되는소자와 전자파의 특성을 분석한다. 이 정보를 활용해 전자파 기반 부채널분석으로 비밀키를 탈취할 수 있음을 보인다.
Abstract
Even theoretically secured cryptographic algorithms could be vulnerable to side-channel analysis, which is a class of cryptanalysis that exploits physical leakage, such as power consumption or electromagnetic emission, to reveal the secret key. So, evaluating side-channel vulnerability and applying side-channel analysis countermeasures are essential to build a secure system on weapon systems. This paper analyzes the characteristics of electromagnetic emission emitted when performing an encryption algorithm on high-performance unmanned vehicle control boards and finds the component related to the encryption algorithm. Using this information, we demonstrate that the secret key could be disclosed via electromagnetic side-channel analysis.
참고문헌 (12)
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