NOTE ON PURE-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA IN MATRIX GAMES
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Pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) is one of the most important concepts in game theory. Tae-Hwan Yoon and O-Hun Kwon gave a ``sufficient condition'' for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in matrix games \cite{1}. They also claimed that the condition was necessary for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in undominated matrix games. In this short note, we show that these claims are not true by giving two examples.
Abstract
Pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) is one of the most important concepts in game theory. Tae-Hwan Yoon and O-Hun Kwon gave a ``sufficient condition'' for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in matrix games \cite{1}. They also claimed that the condition was necessary for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in undominated matrix games. In this short note, we show that these claims are not true by giving two examples.
참고문헌 (5)
- D. Fudenberg, "Game Theory" (1992), The MIT Press
- J. Nash, "Non-cooperative games", Ann. of Math. (2), 54, pp.289~295 (1951)
- G. Owen, "Game Theory" (1982), Academic Press
- J. H. Wang, "The Theory of Games" (1988), TsingHua University Press
- T. Yoon, "On pure-strategy equilibria in matrix games", Bull. Korean Math. Soc, 37(2), pp.377~385 (2000)