전력산업에 있어 투자보수율 규제의 비효율성 개선방안
A Study on the More Efficient Regulatory Pricing Mechanism in Electricity Industry
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초록
우리나라의 전기요금 규제는 전력회사의 투자자본(Invested Capital)에 대한 허용보수율(Allowed Rate of Return)을 책정함으로써 전기요금을 결정하는 방식이 지속적으로 시행되어 왔다. 독점형태로 운영되어 온 공익사업에 대한 요금규제수단으로 널리 이용되어 온 투자보수율에 의한 전기요금 규제는 경쟁체제 도입이라는 전력산업의 새로운 환경변화와 부적합한 측면이 있다. 이 논문에서는 전력산업에 있어 대표적인 요금규제방식인 투자보수율 규제의 문제점들을 다양한 관점에서 분석한 후 인센티브 지향적 전기요금 규제방식들을 종합적으로 검토한다. 구체적으로는 현행 투자보수율 제도를 기본적으로 유지한 틀 내에서의 대안적 요금규제방식들, 투자보수율 조정이나 요금기저의 조정과 같은 이윤수준의 조정방식보다는 가격수준에 대한 직접적 요금규제방식들, 다양한 유인규제방식들의 장점을 취합한 혼합적 인센티브 규제로서 가격상한규제(Price-Cap Regulation) 등을 다루고 있다. 결론에서는 RPI-X 형태의 가격상한규제를 실제 적용하기 위해서 선결되어야 할 구체적 쟁점들에 대해서 언급한다.
Abstract
This paper investigates causes and types of inefficiency problems of the rate-of-return regulation currently instituted in Korean electricity industry. The inefficiency problems inherent in profit-level R-o-R regulation are numerous such as the Averch-Johnson effect and X-inefficiency and agency problems. This paper suggest a shift from profit-level rate-of return regulation to price-level regulation since the latter is theoretically more efficient regulatory mechanism than the former. Under rate-or-return regulation, the regulated firm is largely indifferent to cost increase and lacks incentives to strive for cost efficiency. By breaking the equations between the firm's actual internal costs and allowed revenues, price level regulation regenerates the managerial incentives for profit maximization. Once the maximum price level constraints or ceiling is set as in price cap regulation, the regulated firm loses cost enhancing moral hazard incentives and loses control over revenue enhancing efforts as Hillman and Braeutigam mentioned. The regulated firm's profit maximization becomes mainly a matter of cost minimization. In this respect the goals of productive efficiency, profit maximization and social welfare can be well achieved. This paper investigates also various types of incentive-oriented electricity pricing methods and suggests price-cap regulation.
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