미국 경쟁법상 이윤압착(margin squeeze)에 대한 규제 동향 분석
A Study on Jurisprudence and Precedents of a Margin Squeeze under the U.S. Antitrust Law
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A margin squeeze can occur when an upstream firm sells an input for which there are no good economic substitutes to firms against which the upstream firm also competes in the downstream market. It arises where the margin between the downstream retail price and the wholesale price charged for an input is too small to allow a firm to survive as a retail competitor. This kind of business practice has been recently witnessed even in korean IT industries. The US Supreme Court has specifically addressed only margin squeezes by an integrated firm that has no duty under antitrust law to deal with its downstream rivals. The Court ruled that in such cases US antitrust law does not recognize margin squeezes as a standalone form of anti-competitive abuse. Nevertheless, there has been a general appraisal that a margin squeeze under the US antitrust law has been dealt with an flexible angle of regulation than that under the EU competition law. It may be the reason why analyses on the US antitrust law have been comparatively rare than on EU law. In this consideration, this paper tries to examine jurisprudence, regulation trends and legal precedents on a margin squeeze mainly in the US antitrust law. And it makes some comparison to EU competition law as a conclusion.
Abstract
A margin squeeze can occur when an upstream firm sells an input for which there are no good economic substitutes to firms against which the upstream firm also competes in the downstream market. It arises where the margin between the downstream retail price and the wholesale price charged for an input is too small to allow a firm to survive as a retail competitor. This kind of business practice has been recently witnessed even in korean IT industries. The US Supreme Court has specifically addressed only margin squeezes by an integrated firm that has no duty under antitrust law to deal with its downstream rivals. The Court ruled that in such cases US antitrust law does not recognize margin squeezes as a standalone form of anti-competitive abuse. Nevertheless, there has been a general appraisal that a margin squeeze under the US antitrust law has been dealt with an flexible angle of regulation than that under the EU competition law. It may be the reason why analyses on the US antitrust law have been comparatively rare than on EU law. In this consideration, this paper tries to examine jurisprudence, regulation trends and legal precedents on a margin squeeze mainly in the US antitrust law. And it makes some comparison to EU competition law as a conclusion.
참고문헌 (9)
- Dennis W. Carlton, "Should "Price Squeeze" Be a Recognized Form of A nticompetitive Conduct?", Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2008)
- "Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Pacific Bell Tel Co. v. Link Line Comms, Inc. 2008 WL 2255265 (No. 07-512)", ~ (2008)
- Bruno Komly and Valerie Meunier, Margin Squeeze, Entry and "Umbrella Effect", Working Paper, "Phillippe Chone", ~ (2010)
- "Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Declining to Join the US Department of Justice Recommendation that the United States Supreme Court Review the Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in linkline Comms. v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company", ~ (2008)
- Phillip E Areeda, "Antitrust Law Vol III" (2008), B, Aspen Publishers
- Herbert Hovenkamp, "Federal Antitrust Policy" (2015), West
- Herbert Hovenkamp, "The Viability of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims", Arizona Law Review, 51 (2009)
- Yongmin Chen, "Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing, and Ex Post Cartelization", The RAND Journal of Econ omics, 38(1) (2007)
- OECD, "Margin Squeeze-United States-, Working Party No.2 on Competition and Regulation", ~ (2009)