China’s Perception and Response during the Formation of the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Focused on the period before China’s nuclear development in 1964
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This study analyzes China’s perceptions and responses during the formative period of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Post-World War Ⅱ initiatives such as the Baruch Plan, the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty g(NPT) represented institutional efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, yet China perceived them as mechanisms that institutionalized Western nuclear monopoly and power asymmetry. Consequently, China regarded nuclear development as essential to national security and adopted a critical and rejecting stance toward international arms control and non-proliferation regime. This early position reflected a politically driven response shaped by sovereignty concerns, systemic rivalry, and security perceptions. Through this analysis, this study demonstrates that power imbalances in international norm formation can constrain actors’ acceptance of norms, and suggests that the structural tensions of the early nonproliferation order have similar implications for the denuclearization and security environment on the Korean Peninsula today.
Abstract
This study analyzes China’s perceptions and responses during the formative period of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Post-World War Ⅱ initiatives such as the Baruch Plan, the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty g(NPT) represented institutional efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, yet China perceived them as mechanisms that institutionalized Western nuclear monopoly and power asymmetry. Consequently, China regarded nuclear development as essential to national security and adopted a critical and rejecting stance toward international arms control and non-proliferation regime. This early position reflected a politically driven response shaped by sovereignty concerns, systemic rivalry, and security perceptions. Through this analysis, this study demonstrates that power imbalances in international norm formation can constrain actors’ acceptance of norms, and suggests that the structural tensions of the early nonproliferation order have similar implications for the denuclearization and security environment on the Korean Peninsula today.