Species membership in claiming rights : Critique of Elizabeth Anderson's essay “Animal rights and the values of nonhuman life”
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In this paper, I criticize Elizabeth Anderson's claim that species membership matters in deciding what rights one can claim. In her essay “Animal rights and the values of nonhuman life”, Elizabeth Anderson claims that species membership matters in deciding whether one can claim positive right to human provision. Justification for her claim is that only members of ‘our’ group have positive rights to the group's provision while beings that are not included in ‘our’ group do not have positive rights to the group's provision. Since species difference does indeed decide who is included in ‘our’ group and who is left out, Anderson concludes that species membership decides who can claim positive right to human provision. I claim that Anderson's premise that species difference decides who is included in ‘our’ group is unjustified. I also claim that even if we grant that this premise is true (after revising the premise a little bit), this revised version of premise would force Anderson to accept a conclusion that would be unacceptable. Since Anderson would not be able to accept this ridiculous conclusion, I conclude this paper by claiming that Anderson's claim that species membership makes difference in who gets positive right to human provision is unjustified.
Abstract
In this paper, I criticize Elizabeth Anderson's claim that species membership matters in deciding what rights one can claim. In her essay “Animal rights and the values of nonhuman life”, Elizabeth Anderson claims that species membership matters in deciding whether one can claim positive right to human provision. Justification for her claim is that only members of ‘our’ group have positive rights to the group's provision while beings that are not included in ‘our’ group do not have positive rights to the group's provision. Since species difference does indeed decide who is included in ‘our’ group and who is left out, Anderson concludes that species membership decides who can claim positive right to human provision. I claim that Anderson's premise that species difference decides who is included in ‘our’ group is unjustified. I also claim that even if we grant that this premise is true (after revising the premise a little bit), this revised version of premise would force Anderson to accept a conclusion that would be unacceptable. Since Anderson would not be able to accept this ridiculous conclusion, I conclude this paper by claiming that Anderson's claim that species membership makes difference in who gets positive right to human provision is unjustified.
참고문헌 (15)
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