Potential Games with Change Cost
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We study strategic games where each player has a reference action and incurs a change cost when s/he chooses an action different from his/her reference action. We propose a generalization of exact potential games, called weak potential games, in which the net payoff gain of a deviating player does not exceed the differential of a potential function. We show that a maximizer of a weak potential function is an equilibrium and characterize weak potential games by using a cycle condition. Lastly, we study the property of weak potential maximizers in 2×2 coordination games.
Abstract
We study strategic games where each player has a reference action and incurs a change cost when s/he chooses an action different from his/her reference action. We propose a generalization of exact potential games, called weak potential games, in which the net payoff gain of a deviating player does not exceed the differential of a potential function. We show that a maximizer of a weak potential function is an equilibrium and characterize weak potential games by using a cycle condition. Lastly, we study the property of weak potential maximizers in 2×2 coordination games.
참고문헌 (23)
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