Competitive Search Equilibrium in the Credit Market under Asymmetric Information and Limited Commitment
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This study develops a model of a competitive search credit market under hidden information and limited commitment. The model is explicit about the extensive margin of credit supply, while using the standard bilateral contracting framework for the intensive margin, and the analysis of its equilibrium shows how two margins jointly channel the influences of credit market imperfections. The role of time delays and costs in financial intermediation demonstrated in this study sheds light on, and explains the possibility of, pure credit rationing due to credit frictions. The study also demonstrates the possibility of contract dispersion among homogeneous borrowers.
Abstract
This study develops a model of a competitive search credit market under hidden information and limited commitment. The model is explicit about the extensive margin of credit supply, while using the standard bilateral contracting framework for the intensive margin, and the analysis of its equilibrium shows how two margins jointly channel the influences of credit market imperfections. The role of time delays and costs in financial intermediation demonstrated in this study sheds light on, and explains the possibility of, pure credit rationing due to credit frictions. The study also demonstrates the possibility of contract dispersion among homogeneous borrowers.
참고문헌 (19)
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