A Dynamic Equilibrium Model for Relationship-Lending
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In this paper, we develop a dynamic equilibrium model of banking industry that takes into account for firm and bank heterogeneity and the market for new and existing loans with a full description for the demand and supply of bank loans. The consequences of various shocks to the economy are considered through the equilibrium analysis. The model predicts that as the degree of interbank competition becomes higher, the number of loan relations for each firm becomes smaller. Our model is also consistent with several empirical regularities regarding the loan structure.
Abstract
In this paper, we develop a dynamic equilibrium model of banking industry that takes into account for firm and bank heterogeneity and the market for new and existing loans with a full description for the demand and supply of bank loans. The consequences of various shocks to the economy are considered through the equilibrium analysis. The model predicts that as the degree of interbank competition becomes higher, the number of loan relations for each firm becomes smaller. Our model is also consistent with several empirical regularities regarding the loan structure.
참고문헌 (30)
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