참과 승리의 유비는 참에 대한 다원주의를 지지하는가?
Does Analogy between Truth and Winning Support Alethic Pluralism?
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Winning is typically the goal of playing a game, but what it takes to win changes from one game to the next. Nothing could better exhibit pluralism than this characteristics of winning. Can we apply it to truth equally? Douglas Edwards have done it very impressively, but I think that his work has its limit. In this paper, I’ll show that the analogy of winning can not give alethic pluralism a solid ground by exposing disanalogies behind Edwards’ analogy. This paper will ①sketch the background of pluralistic approaches to truth, ②summarize and criticize the theories of C. Wright and M. Lynch, ③examine the adequacy of Edwards’ analogy between winning and truth from the angles of ‘one’, ‘many’, and ‘between one and many’, and ④confirm the cracks in the ground of alethic pluralism caused by the detected disanalogies. And as a speculation, I’ll suggest a new relation between game and language that will place truth on the different level from winning.
Abstract
Winning is typically the goal of playing a game, but what it takes to win changes from one game to the next. Nothing could better exhibit pluralism than this characteristics of winning. Can we apply it to truth equally? Douglas Edwards have done it very impressively, but I think that his work has its limit. In this paper, I’ll show that the analogy of winning can not give alethic pluralism a solid ground by exposing disanalogies behind Edwards’ analogy. This paper will ①sketch the background of pluralistic approaches to truth, ②summarize and criticize the theories of C. Wright and M. Lynch, ③examine the adequacy of Edwards’ analogy between winning and truth from the angles of ‘one’, ‘many’, and ‘between one and many’, and ④confirm the cracks in the ground of alethic pluralism caused by the detected disanalogies. And as a speculation, I’ll suggest a new relation between game and language that will place truth on the different level from winning.
참고문헌 (17)
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- Wright, Crispin, "A Plurality of Pluralisms", pp.123~156 (2013)