A Hedging Strategy is Needed Toward North Korea

Abstract

The U.S.-led campaign to pressure North Korea into abandoning its quest for nuclear weapons has encountered numerous difficulties. One reason for the lack of progress is that it is unclear why Pyongyang repudiated the 1994 Agreed Framework and is seeking a nuclear weapons capability. It is possible that the DPRK regime is merely using its program as bargaining leverage to obtain concessions from the United States and the nations of East Asia and would be willing to remain non-nuclear in exchange for such concessions. But it is equally possible that North Korea, for reasons of both prestige and security, is deadly serious about becoming a nuclear weapons state. The first scenario means that the crisis probably can be resolved through diplomacy; the second suggests that the crisis will intensify. In any case, Washington’s strategy of forging a common front among Pyongyang’s neighbors to pressure the regime has not yet produced meaningful results. That is especially true of the reliance on China to exert the necessary diplomatic and economic pressure. Although the PRC is in the best position to influence North Korea, the Beijing government is reluctant to use that leverage. The United States needs a hedging strategy in the event that the DPRK will not relinquish its nuclear ambitions. Preemptive military action is not a realistic option, since it would likely trigger a disastrous war on the Korean Peninsula. Instead, America’s fallback strategy should be to deter North Korea by making it clear that any transfer of nuclear weapons or technology to terrorist organizations or rogue states would mean war.