Enlisting China to Stop a Nuclear North Korea

Abstract

North Korea’s recent nuclear test further reduces the likelihood of dissuadingPyongyang from developing a nuclear arsenal. The North’s willingness to negotiateseriously is unclear, but the country with the greatest influence on Pyongyang isChina.However, Beijing more fears a collapse of the North and creation of a unifiedKorea allied with America than it fears a North Korean nuclear weapon. Thus, theUnited States must emphasize that China would be unable to avoid the costs ofNorth Korean nuclear proliferation.Continuing nuclear activities in the North would encourage the United Statesto push for tighter sanctions and consider military action. Moreover, Washingtonshould indicate that it would not seek to dissuade South Korea and Japan frombuilding countervailing weapons should Pyongyang move ahead.Under these circumstances, China would have an incentive to increase pressureon North Korea to cooperate. In particular, Beijing should work with surroundingstates to cut off the luxuries (and the cash transfers used to pay for them) which areused by Kim Jong Il to cement the loyalty of party officials and military officers.Moreover, China should open its border to North Korean refugees, which would helpdestabilize the Kim regime.In return, the United States, South Korea, Japan, and other states should aidChina by accepting refugees and contributing money to alleviate Beijing’s burden incaring for North Koreans crossing the border. Moreover, Washington shouldpromise not to take geopolitical advantage of Chinese cooperation; in the event ofunification, the United States would withdraw its troops and end its militaryalliance with the Republic of Korea, thereby eliminating an American presence onChina’s border.The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis , Vol. XVIII, No. 4, Winter 2006, pp. 7393.