Playing with Fire: the United States’ Nuclear Policy Toward North Korea

Abstract

This essay is a brief attempt to analyze the implications of the February 13, 2007 agreement reached at the Six-Party Talks in Beijing—focusing on its longterm significance in the larger geopolitical context of East Asia. The February agreement has five major components: denuclearization, improving DPRK-U.S. relations, improving DPRK-Japan relations, economic and energy assistance and finally, a peace treaty in place of the 1953 armistice agreement. How these five challenging tasks will be implemented in detail remains to be seen. Washington has been playing with the North Korean fire since the Korean War, with no resolution in sight. The protracted containment policy of the United States has not been well-conceived or executed and essentially, U.S. policy has been dysfunctional ever since the war. Bush is uncertain of how to play with the North’s nuclear fire. For one thing, his administration appears to be divided between those that advocate regime change and those supporting diplomacy. The hawkish group appears weakened but not completely removed. The February agreement has five major components: denuclearization, improving DPRK-U.S. relations, improving DPRK-Japan relations, economic and energy assistance and finally, a peace treaty in place of the 1953 armistice agreement. How these five challenging tasks will be implemented in detail remains to be seen. Even as a lame duck president, Bush has still about two more years. Would that be a long enough time to make a package deal with Pyongyang if Bush wishes? Such a deal would enable Pyongyang and Washington to eventually normalize relations by signing a formal treaty to replace the existing armistice.