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New Games in Tightly Fixed Structures: North Korea’s Volatile Desperation and China’s Cornered Strategy

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What has happened to North Korea-China relations since autumn 2009 is nothing less than a renewal of the alliance. This is a sea change, brought about first of all by the deterioration of Kim Jong Il’s health and then by all the resulting turmoil of his regime’s instability and difficulties. Both sides’ policy behavior toward the other became a “new game,” dictated by a sort of dire emergency, and placed them in a tightly fixed structure reducing much of the scope for a strategy adjustment. Pyongyang’s new game has been characterized prominently by volatility or a malfunctioning of the “rational” policymaking capacity of the ailing dictator. Volatile desperation dominates behavior in the leadership succession, in military affairs, the nuclear arms program, its posture toward the United States and ROK,respectively, and in its relations with China. The new game can be defined as one between a volatile DPRK and a relatively loyal ally with an anxious strategy that is cornered in its relations with the ROK and the United States on the North Korean issue. China’s relationship with the DPRK is the most complicated of all,and in a sense disabling. As to China-ROK cooperation on the North Korea issue,the above factors unfortunately dim the prospects; however, there is still reason for optimism if efforts continue to be made to find a resolution to the problem.

Abstract

What has happened to North Korea-China relations since autumn 2009 is nothing less than a renewal of the alliance. This is a sea change, brought about first of all by the deterioration of Kim Jong Il’s health and then by all the resulting turmoil of his regime’s instability and difficulties. Both sides’ policy behavior toward the other became a “new game,” dictated by a sort of dire emergency, and placed them in a tightly fixed structure reducing much of the scope for a strategy adjustment. Pyongyang’s new game has been characterized prominently by volatility or a malfunctioning of the “rational” policymaking capacity of the ailing dictator. Volatile desperation dominates behavior in the leadership succession, in military affairs, the nuclear arms program, its posture toward the United States and ROK,respectively, and in its relations with China. The new game can be defined as one between a volatile DPRK and a relatively loyal ally with an anxious strategy that is cornered in its relations with the ROK and the United States on the North Korean issue. China’s relationship with the DPRK is the most complicated of all,and in a sense disabling. As to China-ROK cooperation on the North Korea issue,the above factors unfortunately dim the prospects; however, there is still reason for optimism if efforts continue to be made to find a resolution to the problem.

참고문헌 (60)

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