Prospects for China’s North Korea Strategy in the Post-Kim Jong-il Era and Implications for South Korea
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This paper asserts that with the advent of the post-Kim Jong-il era,China will advance from its previous role of mere balancer and seek to become a more active manager in pursuit of its own national interests. China hopes for a softer, more stable North Korean regime, so that a mutually beneficial partnership can develop between the two states. China believes that it must adjust and take on a new role in the process of North Korea’s “normalization.” China also expects that by adopting this new role, it can restructure North Korea into a strategic buffer zone in the long term. This Chinese perspective can be seen as not merely an attempt to manage the situation, but rather a visionary approach toward the North Korean issue. This is expected to spark considerable controversy within South Korea concerning its Chinese policy. From a progressive viewpoint, the new Chinese approach concerning the stabilization of the North Korean region, the softening of the North Korean regime, and the development of mutually beneficial relations,resembles the Sunshine Policy of South Korea in certain aspects. But from a conservative perspective, while there has been a noticeable shift in China’s attitude toward North Korea, there is no detectable change in its actual North Korea policy. For the conservatives, China’s approach to North Korea is likely to be seen as an attempt to expand its influence on the Korean peninsula for self-gain. These changes will be intertwined with the political schedule of South Korea and may incite social controversy over what kind of strategic position South Korea should occupy between the U.S. and China.
Abstract
This paper asserts that with the advent of the post-Kim Jong-il era,China will advance from its previous role of mere balancer and seek to become a more active manager in pursuit of its own national interests. China hopes for a softer, more stable North Korean regime, so that a mutually beneficial partnership can develop between the two states. China believes that it must adjust and take on a new role in the process of North Korea’s “normalization.” China also expects that by adopting this new role, it can restructure North Korea into a strategic buffer zone in the long term. This Chinese perspective can be seen as not merely an attempt to manage the situation, but rather a visionary approach toward the North Korean issue. This is expected to spark considerable controversy within South Korea concerning its Chinese policy. From a progressive viewpoint, the new Chinese approach concerning the stabilization of the North Korean region, the softening of the North Korean regime, and the development of mutually beneficial relations,resembles the Sunshine Policy of South Korea in certain aspects. But from a conservative perspective, while there has been a noticeable shift in China’s attitude toward North Korea, there is no detectable change in its actual North Korea policy. For the conservatives, China’s approach to North Korea is likely to be seen as an attempt to expand its influence on the Korean peninsula for self-gain. These changes will be intertwined with the political schedule of South Korea and may incite social controversy over what kind of strategic position South Korea should occupy between the U.S. and China.
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