The Russian Hybrid War in the Ukraine Crisis: Some Characteristics and Implications
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This paper examines some characteristics of the Russian hybrid war in the Ukrainecrisis since 2014, and then explores its implications. The hybrid approach isdesigned to generate “plausible deniability,” allowing Putin maximal tacticalflexibility while avoiding responsibility. Russia’s hybrid warfare can be tracedwith some devices: propaganda (including cyber attack), tactics, the militants,and weapons. The meaning of the Russian hybrid war in Ukraine is focused on thethree points. Firstly, Russia’s new approach, “hybrid war” cannot be consideredindependent of a long professional experience of Putin’s KGB operations beforebecoming a politician. Secondly, hybrid type warfare in Ukraine is not the first timefor Russia. Putin previously applied his new kind of war almost unnoticed to thesmall and remote Georgia and Transnistria, but it cannot go without being understoodwhen applied on a scale as large and visible as Ukraine. Thirdly, Russia’s actionsin Ukraine have exploded the notion that expansive communications technologiesand economic interdependence were fostering a kind of grand bargain. TheUkraine crisis suggests that world history after the Cold War is at an inflectionpoint. In a world of hybrid warfare or non-linear conflict, we need to find newforms of deterrence.
Abstract
This paper examines some characteristics of the Russian hybrid war in the Ukrainecrisis since 2014, and then explores its implications. The hybrid approach isdesigned to generate “plausible deniability,” allowing Putin maximal tacticalflexibility while avoiding responsibility. Russia’s hybrid warfare can be tracedwith some devices: propaganda (including cyber attack), tactics, the militants,and weapons. The meaning of the Russian hybrid war in Ukraine is focused on thethree points. Firstly, Russia’s new approach, “hybrid war” cannot be consideredindependent of a long professional experience of Putin’s KGB operations beforebecoming a politician. Secondly, hybrid type warfare in Ukraine is not the first timefor Russia. Putin previously applied his new kind of war almost unnoticed to thesmall and remote Georgia and Transnistria, but it cannot go without being understoodwhen applied on a scale as large and visible as Ukraine. Thirdly, Russia’s actionsin Ukraine have exploded the notion that expansive communications technologiesand economic interdependence were fostering a kind of grand bargain. TheUkraine crisis suggests that world history after the Cold War is at an inflectionpoint. In a world of hybrid warfare or non-linear conflict, we need to find newforms of deterrence.
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