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The Future of North Korean Strategy

Narushige Michishita
한국국방연구원 (Korea Institute for Defense Analyses)|2009.03|The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis|제21권 제1호|pp. 103-121|DOI 10.22883/kjda.2009.21.1.007

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초록

By the early 1990s, North Korea’s policy objectives had become defensive, focused on regime and economic survival. North Korea attempted to achieve this goal by trying to normalize relations with the United States and Japan. North Korea’s security and foreign policy strategy has largely remained constant. On the military front, North Korea maintained strong deterrents and simultaneously resorted to nuclear brinkmanship to achieve the abovementioned goal. On the diplomatic front, it continued to use equidistance policy to maximize its security and economic gains. In order to cope with some fundamental policy dilemmas, North Korean leaders have used cybernetic decision-making, exemplified by the cyclical application of adventurism and caution, coercion and dialogue, and socialist central planning and reformist economic management. There are at least three policy opportunities or options that could result in a major transformation of North Korea’s policy orientation: (1) normalization of relations with the United States and Japan; (2) a decision to accept peaceful coexistence with South Korea; and (3) a decision to substantially reduce military forces and divert resources to economic development. By taking these options, North Korea would be able to enhance its state survival, strengthen its international position, and achieve economic reconstruction.

Abstract

By the early 1990s, North Korea’s policy objectives had become defensive, focused on regime and economic survival. North Korea attempted to achieve this goal by trying to normalize relations with the United States and Japan. North Korea’s security and foreign policy strategy has largely remained constant. On the military front, North Korea maintained strong deterrents and simultaneously resorted to nuclear brinkmanship to achieve the abovementioned goal. On the diplomatic front, it continued to use equidistance policy to maximize its security and economic gains. In order to cope with some fundamental policy dilemmas, North Korean leaders have used cybernetic decision-making, exemplified by the cyclical application of adventurism and caution, coercion and dialogue, and socialist central planning and reformist economic management. There are at least three policy opportunities or options that could result in a major transformation of North Korea’s policy orientation: (1) normalization of relations with the United States and Japan; (2) a decision to accept peaceful coexistence with South Korea; and (3) a decision to substantially reduce military forces and divert resources to economic development. By taking these options, North Korea would be able to enhance its state survival, strengthen its international position, and achieve economic reconstruction.

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