A Symmetries in Multi-products Duopoly and Conditions for Mixed Bundling Equilibrium
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This paper deals with the choices among pure components, pure bundling, and mixed bundling in a duopoly. It uses the Hotelling model with a cross-lined distribution of consumers. This model reflects the situation where the degrees of product differentiation, the costs of the pure and hybrid systems, and the distribution of consumers are asymmetric. The analysis demonstrates that both firms can choose the mixed bundling strategy in equilibrium and that the prisoner's dilemma can be avoided when the number of consumers who prefer the pure systems is relatively large. In addition, characteristics of equilibrium, according to various combinations of strategy, are derived.
Abstract
This paper deals with the choices among pure components, pure bundling, and mixed bundling in a duopoly. It uses the Hotelling model with a cross-lined distribution of consumers. This model reflects the situation where the degrees of product differentiation, the costs of the pure and hybrid systems, and the distribution of consumers are asymmetric. The analysis demonstrates that both firms can choose the mixed bundling strategy in equilibrium and that the prisoner's dilemma can be avoided when the number of consumers who prefer the pure systems is relatively large. In addition, characteristics of equilibrium, according to various combinations of strategy, are derived.
참고문헌 (13)
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