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Relationship between IGO Participation and Militarized Disputes: Analysis of Reciprocal Causation

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This study examines theoretical arguments regarding the relationship between the participation of intergovernmental organizations and the onset of militarized interstate disputes. International relations theories posit that diplomatic cooperation among states in diverse areas of intergovernmental organizations deters military tensions and disputes among states. For example, in his perpetual peace theory, Immanuel Kant (1991) identied three preconditions for peace in the international system: democratic norms and institutions, economic interdependence, and active participation in intergovernmental organizations. Compared to the rather active scholarly interest in the first two pillars of Kant’s perpetual peace theory, few scholars have conducted empirical examinations of the third pillar. In this study, we empirically examine the third pillar of Kantian peace: the relationship between shared IGO participation and militarized disputes. We nd that from 1816–2001, the relationship was in fact two-way; shared IGO participation deterred military disputes, and the onset of disputes reduced shared IGO participation. Kant argued that active participation in intergovernmental organizations fosters an environment conducive to peaceful relations among states, and that military cooperation promotes diplomatic cooperation in the international setting. Finally, in terms of policy implications, this study highlights the need for interstate cooperation in diverse intergovernmental organizations to ensure peace and stability among states in the international system.

Abstract

This study examines theoretical arguments regarding the relationship between the participation of intergovernmental organizations and the onset of militarized interstate disputes. International relations theories posit that diplomatic cooperation among states in diverse areas of intergovernmental organizations deters military tensions and disputes among states. For example, in his perpetual peace theory, Immanuel Kant (1991) identied three preconditions for peace in the international system: democratic norms and institutions, economic interdependence, and active participation in intergovernmental organizations. Compared to the rather active scholarly interest in the first two pillars of Kant’s perpetual peace theory, few scholars have conducted empirical examinations of the third pillar. In this study, we empirically examine the third pillar of Kantian peace: the relationship between shared IGO participation and militarized disputes. We nd that from 1816–2001, the relationship was in fact two-way; shared IGO participation deterred military disputes, and the onset of disputes reduced shared IGO participation. Kant argued that active participation in intergovernmental organizations fosters an environment conducive to peaceful relations among states, and that military cooperation promotes diplomatic cooperation in the international setting. Finally, in terms of policy implications, this study highlights the need for interstate cooperation in diverse intergovernmental organizations to ensure peace and stability among states in the international system.

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