The First Thing They Would Do: Policy Choices of the USSR, Israel, and the UK after Direct Nuclear Deterrence Failure
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
Nuclear weapons have not been used since their first deployment in 1945. If the use of these weapons as a punitive tool is highly improbable, can a nuclear deterrent threat ever be credible? What strategies would nuclear powers be inclined to adopt to bolster the credibility of nuclear punishment if deterrence fails? While Nuclear Pessimists argue that there is no way to solve the inherent incredibility problem of nuclear punishment, the Nuclear Revolutionists and Rational Punishment approach suggest avenues of incurring “autonomous risk” and employing “limited retaliation” to address the issue. This article, however, argues that it is essential to secure the feasibility of punishment to make a deterrent threat credible. The credibility of nuclear deterrence can be restored when the defender makes continuous efforts to turn these weapons into a militarily and politically feasible tool of punishment. It traces and compares Moscow, Tel Aviv, and London’s policy choices after their direct deterrence failures in 1969, 1973, and 1982. The article finds that the most efficient way to de-escalate a crisis is to address the feasibility problem. While all three countries succeeded in inducing their adversaries to abandon attempts at altering the status quo, Israel and the UK had to engage in costly wars as they excluded the nuclear option. In contrast, the Soviet Union accomplished the goal by combining measures to enhance the feasibility of nuclear punishment and deploying controlled retaliation tactics below the threshold of full-scale war.
Abstract
Nuclear weapons have not been used since their first deployment in 1945. If the use of these weapons as a punitive tool is highly improbable, can a nuclear deterrent threat ever be credible? What strategies would nuclear powers be inclined to adopt to bolster the credibility of nuclear punishment if deterrence fails? While Nuclear Pessimists argue that there is no way to solve the inherent incredibility problem of nuclear punishment, the Nuclear Revolutionists and Rational Punishment approach suggest avenues of incurring “autonomous risk” and employing “limited retaliation” to address the issue. This article, however, argues that it is essential to secure the feasibility of punishment to make a deterrent threat credible. The credibility of nuclear deterrence can be restored when the defender makes continuous efforts to turn these weapons into a militarily and politically feasible tool of punishment. It traces and compares Moscow, Tel Aviv, and London’s policy choices after their direct deterrence failures in 1969, 1973, and 1982. The article finds that the most efficient way to de-escalate a crisis is to address the feasibility problem. While all three countries succeeded in inducing their adversaries to abandon attempts at altering the status quo, Israel and the UK had to engage in costly wars as they excluded the nuclear option. In contrast, the Soviet Union accomplished the goal by combining measures to enhance the feasibility of nuclear punishment and deploying controlled retaliation tactics below the threshold of full-scale war.
참고문헌 (79)
- "Russia’s Putin Issues New Nuclear Warnings to West over Ukraine" (2023)[URL]
- "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China" (2022)[URL]
- "North Korea Passes Nuclear Law" (2022)[URL]
- Nina Tannenwald, "The Vanishing Nuclear Taboo? How Disarmament Fell Apart", Foreign Affairs (2018)
- "Most Russians Oppose Using Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine" (2022)[URL]
- Bernard Brodie, "The Absolute Weapon" (1946), Harcourt Brace
- Thomas C. Schelling, "Arms and Influence" (1966), Yale University Press
- Robert Jervis, "The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution" (1989), Cornell University Press
- Robert Powell, "Nuclear Deterrence Theory : The Search for Credibility" (1990), Cambridge University Press
- Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed", pp.3~45 (2003), W. W. Norton & Company
- William L. Border, "There Will Be No Time" (1946), Macmillan
- Paul Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy", Foreign Affairs, 34(2), pp.187~188 (1956)
- Colin Gray, "Nuclear Strategy and National Style" (1986), Hamilton Press
- T. V. Paul, "Self-deterrence : Nuclear Weapons and the Enduring Credibility Challenge", Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 71(1), pp.30~ (2016)
- Todd S. Sechser, "Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy" (2017), Cambridge University Press
- Lawrence Freedman, "Deterrence", pp.3~ (2004), Polity Press
- Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should Be Done?", International Security, 16(1), pp.5~41 (1991)
- Charles L. Glaser, "Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy", pp.104~105 (1990), Princeton University Press
- "Ballistic Missile Defense Intercept Flight Test Record, Fact Sheet" (2019)[URL]
- Robert A. Pape, "Bombing to Win : Air Power and Coercion in War", pp.36~ (1996), Cornell University Press
- Geoffrey Blainey, "The Causes of War" (1988), Free Press
- Albert Carnesale, "Living with Nuclear Weapons", pp.44~ (1983), Bantam Books
- Scott D. Sagan, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed", pp.114~115 (2003), W.W. Norton & Company
- Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror", Foreign Affairs, 37(2), pp.211~234 (1959)
- James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes", American Political Science Review, 88(3), pp.577~592 (1994)
- Frank C. Zagare, "Perfect Deterrence" (2000), Cambridge University Press
- Branislav L. Slantchev, "Military Threats : The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace" (2011), Cambridge University Press
- Patrick Morgan, "Deterrence Now", pp.46~48 (2003), Cambridge University Press
- Frank C. Zagare, "Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence : A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory", Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16(2), pp.107~141 (2004)
- Rose McDermott, "Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It : The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence", Texas National Security Review, 1(1), pp.69~88 (2017)
- Frank P. Harvey, "The Future’s Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War", pp.22~32 (1997), McGill-Queen’s University Press
- Alexander L. George, "Deterrence in American Foreign Policy" (1974), Columbia University Press
- Paul K. Huth, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980", World Politics, 36(4), pp.496~526 (1984)
- Paul K. Huth, "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation", International Studies Quarterly, 32(1), pp.29~45 (1988)
- Richard K. Betts, "Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance" (1987), Brookings Institution
- Daniel S. Geller, "Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34(2), pp.291~310 (1990)
- Glenn H. Snyder, "The Balance of Power", pp.184~201 (1965), Chandler
- Lyle J. Goldstein, "Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Historical Analysis" (2005), Stanford University Press
- Nina Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb : Origins of the Nuclear Taboo", International Security, 29(4), pp.5~49 (2005)
- Reid B.C. Pauly, "Would U.S. Leaders Push the Button? Wargames and the Sources of Nuclear Restraint", International Security, 43(2), pp.151~192 (2018)
- Thomas C. Schelling, "The Strategy of Conflict", pp.187~203 (1960), Harvard University Press
- Robert Powell, "Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense", International Security, 27(4), pp.86~118 (2003)
- Robert Powell, "Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power", International Organization, 69(3), pp.589~626 (2015)
- Sergei Khrushchev, "Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower", pp.559~ (2000), Penn State University Press
- Aleksandr Fursenko, "One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964", pp.242~243 (1997), W. W. Norton &Company
- William Taubman, "Khrushchev : The Man and His Era", pp.562~ (2003), W. W. Norton & Company
- Robert Jervis, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal", pp.1~39 (2015), Routledge
- Vipin Narang, "Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict", pp.14~252 (2014), Princeton University Press
- Kim Yang Gyu, "Infeasible Punishment and Noneffective Threats: Political Feasibility of Nuclear Punishment and Policy Choices after Direct Nuclear Deterrence Failure", Pacific Focus, 37(3), pp.377~407 (2022), 국제관계연구소[DOI]
- Yang Gyu Kim, "At the Brink of Nuclear War:Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis", All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, 10(2) (1962)[DOI]
- Yang Gyu Kim, "After Deterrence: Policy Choices during Crises of Conventional and Nuclear Direct Deterrence Failure", PhD, pp.2019
- Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences", pp.153~155 (2005), MIT Press
- The Sino–Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969, "Michael S. Gerson", Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 10~ (2010)
- Yang Kuisong, "The Sino–Soviet Border Clash of 1969 : From Zhenbao Island to Sino–American Rapprochement", Cold War History, 1(1), pp.23~ (2000)
- Taylor Fravel, "Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes", pp.19~21 (2008), Princeton University Press
- Allen S. Whiting, "China’s Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan", International Security, 26(2), pp.118~ (2001)
- Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino–Soviet Border Dispute : Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes", American Political Science Review, 66(4), pp.1189~1190 (1972)
- John B. Allcock, "Border and Territorial Disputes", pp.446~447 (1992), Longman Group
- "Israel’s Wars"[URL]
- Henry A. Kissinger, "Years of Upheaval", pp.459~ (1982), Little Brown & Co
- Thomas W. Lippman, "Hero of the Crossing: How Anwar Sadat and the 1973 War Changed the World", pp.5~6 (2016), University of Nebraska Press
- Patrick Seale, "Asad of Syria : The Struggle for the Middle East", pp.196~ (1989), University of California Press
- Anwar al-Sadat, "In Search of Identity : An Autobiography", pp.242~ (1977), Harper Collins
- Uri Bar-Joseph, "Last Chance to Avoid War : Sadat’s Peace Initiative of February 1973 and Its Failure", Journal of Contemporary History, 41(3), pp.546~ (2006)
- Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars?, "Elli Lieberman", National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 41~45, pp.McNair Paper 45 (1995)
- "The Israeli ‘Nuclear Alert’of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis" (2013)[URL]
- Shlomo Aronson, "Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective", pp.172~173 (1978), Johns Hopkins University Press
- Avner Cohen, "Israel and the Bomb", pp.274~ (1998), Perseus Books
- Avner Cohen, "Planning the Unthinkable: How New Nuclear Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons", pp.117~124 (2000), Cornell University Press
- Yair Evron, "Israel’s Nuclear Dilemma", pp.72~73 (1994), Cornell University Press
- Shmuel Tzabag, "Termination of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Syria : Positions, Decisions and Constraints at Israel’s Ministerial Level", Middle Eastern Studies, 37(4), pp.190~ (2001)
- Simon Dunstan, "The Yom Kippur War: The Arab–Israeli War of 1973", pp.205~207 (2007), Osprey Publishing
- Mark Tessler, "A History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict", pp.477~481 (1994), Indiana University Press
- Daniel K. Gibran, "The Falklands War: Britain versus the Past in the South Atlantic", pp.13~44 (1998), McFarland & Company, Inc
- Jessica L. Weeks, "Dictators at War and Peace", pp.107~109 (2014), Cornell University Press
- Lawrence Freedman, "Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982", pp.123~ (1991), Princeton University Press
- Michael Parsons, "30 Years after: Issues and Representations of the Falklands War", pp.60~ (2015), Ashgate
- Marc Fourches, "30 Years after: Issues and Representations of the Falklands War", pp.119~132 (2015), Ashgate
- Charles Maisonneuve, "30 Years after: Issues and Representations of the Falklands War", pp.141~ (2015), Ashgate