Economic Implications for North Korea of Strengthened Relations with Russia Amid the Russia–Ukraine War
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This study analyzes recent shifts in economic relations between North Korea and Russia, focusing on potential areas for future cooperation and their likely effects on the North Korean economy. Our analysis indicates that although the Russia–Ukraine war has revitalized bilateral relations, major challenges remain for sustainable economic cooperation. North Korea’s ability to expand exports to Russia beyond military supplies is constrained by overlapping comparative advantages, weak trade networks, poor infrastructure, and high costs—many of which could be mitigated by China’s active involvement in the economic cooperation. Based on our scenario analysis, we argue that although closer ties with Russia may temporarily boost North Korea’s economy, they are unlikely to drive long-term structural changes because of China’s passive stance on its involvement in North Korea–Russia economic cooperation. These findings suggest that China’s active involvement is vital for maximizing the potential of this cooperation and for forming a North Korea–China–Russia economic bloc. In response, South Korea should enhance surveillance, enforce sanctions to limit North Korea’s military production capabilities, and strengthen diplomatic communication with Russia and China.
Abstract
This study analyzes recent shifts in economic relations between North Korea and Russia, focusing on potential areas for future cooperation and their likely effects on the North Korean economy. Our analysis indicates that although the Russia–Ukraine war has revitalized bilateral relations, major challenges remain for sustainable economic cooperation. North Korea’s ability to expand exports to Russia beyond military supplies is constrained by overlapping comparative advantages, weak trade networks, poor infrastructure, and high costs—many of which could be mitigated by China’s active involvement in the economic cooperation. Based on our scenario analysis, we argue that although closer ties with Russia may temporarily boost North Korea’s economy, they are unlikely to drive long-term structural changes because of China’s passive stance on its involvement in North Korea–Russia economic cooperation. These findings suggest that China’s active involvement is vital for maximizing the potential of this cooperation and for forming a North Korea–China–Russia economic bloc. In response, South Korea should enhance surveillance, enforce sanctions to limit North Korea’s military production capabilities, and strengthen diplomatic communication with Russia and China.
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