韓 · 中間의 세이프가드 關聯紛爭과 對應에 關한 硏究

Abstract

After more than 15 years of negotiations, China was finally able to achieve the WTO membership, opening up new trade opportunities for China as well as existing WTO members. China accepted a special safeguard mechanism as one of its WTO-plus commitments. And in response, Korea has since introduced China special safeguard rules, which in simple terms, allows an invocation of safeguard measures against Chinese product imports under more lapse conditions than would normally be allowed under the existing general safeguard rules. China also introduced new safeguard rules in November 2001 in an effort to increase transparency in its operation of safeguard measures. However, the current article contends that the new rules pose a serious threat to free trade in the form of the retaliation provision, which enables China to take unilateral retaliatory actions against safeguard measures on Chinese product imports. It indicates that the provision could be operated in an arbitrary manner a la U.S. Super 301, and lead to infringements of WTO disciplines. The current article diagnosis that the foregoing elements could lead to more trade disputes between Korea and China regarding safeguard measures and subsequent retaliations on the hills of the so called the "Garlic War". The current article goes on to offer policy recommendations toward deterring such disputes. First, it recommends a more active invocation of Korea's own retaliatory provision against China's unilateral actions at least to gain negotiating leverage. Second, it sites problems involving China's still conspicuous state-trading practices, and proposes to raise issues agains China to induce more faithful implementation of WTO disciplines. Finally, it stresses the importance of preventing disputes before they arise, and suggests several specific preventive measures.