신규 사외이사의 임명에 관한 연구: 사회적 연결을 중심으로
Research on outside directors’ social ties and their appointments
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초록
본 연구는 신규 사외이사의 임명결정요인으로 사외이사가 가진 사회적 연결의 역할을 살펴보았다. 신규 사외이사의 임명결정과정에 있어서 사회적 연결의 역할을 살펴본 기존의 연구들은 자원의존이론과 사회적 계층이론에 근거한다. 본 논문에서 우리는 두 이론의 타당성을 실증적으로 검증해보고, 나아가 대리인 이론과 상대적 지위이론에 근거하여, 사회적 연결을 기업 내 상대적 권력의 차이의 원천으로 인식하는 새로운 이론을 제시하고 이를 실증적으로 검증해보았다. 2000년 한국의 상장 제조 기업들에서 새로이 임명된 신규 사외이사들을 대상으로 한 실증분석을 통해, 우리는 신규 사외이사의 임명결정과정에서 최고경영자의 사회적 연결의 수준이 중요한 역할을 하고 있음을 발견하였다. 하지만, 전체 비즈니스 엘리트집단을 대상으로 최고경영자의 사회적 연결의 수준을 비교하는 자원의존이론과 사회계층이론은 지지되지 않았으며, 반면 이사회 내 사회적 연결의 상대적 수준을 강조하는 우리의 이론은 지지되었다. 본 연구의 실증분석 결과는 최고경영자의 이사회 내에서의 상대적 지위가 최고경영자의 행동에 중요한 영향을 미치며, 이사회 내에서의 최고경영자의 상대적 지위가 비즈니스 엘리트집단 전체에서의 지위보다 최고경영자의 행동에 보다 직접적인 영향을 미침을 시사한다.
Abstract
In this study, we examined the role of social ties in the appointments of new outside directors. Extant studies on this topic have relied on resource dependence theory and social class theory. We empirically tested the validity of these two theories and then we attempted to develop a new theory by integrating agency theory and relative status theory. Our theory perceives individuals’ social ties as the source of relative power within the board and argues that CEOs' relative power within their board affects who will be appointed as new outside directors. Using hand-collected data on the social ties of CEOs and new outside directors in Korean firms in 2000, we found empirical support for our theory. However, neither resource dependence theory nor social capital theory received empirical support. We found that the level of CEO social ties in comparison to other board members is negatively associated with the level of new outside directors’ social ties. Our results suggest that CEOs’ relative status within their firm affects their decisions including the appointments of new outside directors.
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