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정치연관이 기업성과에 미치는 영향에 관한 실증 연구: 중국의 상장 중소기업을 중심으로

Political Connections And Firm Performance: Evidence From Chinese Listed Firms

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참고문헌

키워드

주제분류경영학

초록

본 연구는 정부와 연결된 중국 상장 기업의 재무적 성과를 실증적으로 분석하였다. 기존의 연구가 정부와의 연결을 단편적으로 측정하였다면 본 연구는 중국 정부의 구조를 성(省)/시(市)/현(縣)급의 위계적 방식으로 분해하여 어떠한 수준의 정부와 연계된 기업이 보다 나은 성과를 거두었는지 검증하였다. 방법론적으로는 다중회귀와 함께 위계회귀, 그리고 분위회귀분석을 동시에 사용하여 지역효과를 통제하였으며, 성과분위별 정치연관의 한계 효과가 어떻게 달라지는지 조사하여, 이질적인 위치와 성과집단에 속하는 기업과 정부 간 꽌시(關係)의 효과를 조사하였다. 중국 A주 증시에 상장된 272개 중소기업 최고경영자의 정치적 배경을 조사하여 이를 재무적 성과와 연결한 결과 본 연구는 시(市)급 이상의 정부와 연결된 기업의 성과는 감소되는 반면, 현(縣)급 이하의 지방 정부와 연결된 기업의 성과는 통계적으로 증진되는 것을 발견하였다. 또한 재무적 성과가 아주 높거나 낮은 극단 분위에 속한 기업의 경우 정치 연과의 한계효과가 유의미하지 하지 않았다. 본 연구는 개발도상국가 정부와의 정치적 관계 설정에 고심하는 다국적 기업의 對정부 정치 전략 수립에 실무적인 함의를 가질 것으로 기대한다.

Abstract

This article examines the performance of firms with politically connected top managers. Specifically, this research argues that firm performance from non-market strategies depends on the level of local governments to be connected. The empirical findings from OLS regression, multilevel analysis and quantile regression, based on Chinese listed firms, support the view that political connection with upper-tier governments negatively affect the firm performance while political connection with bottom-tier government positively affect the firm performance. The present results imply that hierarchical government system shapes political market of the firms differently. My results suggest that returns of political connection is decreased and even disappeared in highest or lowest performed firms, which was largely neglected in previous papers. This study also has implications for MNEs that manage the business-government relationship in the host country.

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