The Role of Imagination in False Anticipatory Pleasure (Philebus 38a-40e)
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In his conversation with Protarchus in the Philebus, the Platonic Socrates tries to prove that pleasures can be false. His first goal is to show that the true/false distinction applies to the pleasures that we experience when we anticipate the satisfaction of a desire. After two unsuccessful attempts, his final attempt in 38a-40e introduces the faculty of imagination as a key component in the psychology of hedonic anticipation. This link with the imaginative representation of an expected future state of affairs is then used as the basis for a proof that such pleasure can be true or false. My analysis of this problematic if fascinating piece reasoning seeks to clarify, first, how imagination, according to this theory, enables anticipatory pleasure; second, how the argument works that seeks to justify the applicability of the true/false distinction to imagination-based forward-looking pleasure; and third, how the recourse to the faculty of imagination helps Socrates’ dialectic in his exchange with Protarchus.
Abstract
In his conversation with Protarchus in the Philebus, the Platonic Socrates tries to prove that pleasures can be false. His first goal is to show that the true/false distinction applies to the pleasures that we experience when we anticipate the satisfaction of a desire. After two unsuccessful attempts, his final attempt in 38a-40e introduces the faculty of imagination as a key component in the psychology of hedonic anticipation. This link with the imaginative representation of an expected future state of affairs is then used as the basis for a proof that such pleasure can be true or false. My analysis of this problematic if fascinating piece reasoning seeks to clarify, first, how imagination, according to this theory, enables anticipatory pleasure; second, how the argument works that seeks to justify the applicability of the true/false distinction to imagination-based forward-looking pleasure; and third, how the recourse to the faculty of imagination helps Socrates’ dialectic in his exchange with Protarchus.
참고문헌 (22)
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