Speeches as Images of Being: Phaedo 99d4-100a8 and Sophist 254d4-256e7

Abstract

This paper argues that the metaphysical section in Plato’s Sophist 254d4-256e7 is plausibly read as an instance of the method of hypothesis introduced in the Phaedo. I first note that Socrates’ motivation for orienting his inquiry by speech, mentioned in Phaedo 99d4-100a8, is that speech (logos) is in one sense imagistic and in another sense not. Then I argue that this claim can be fleshed out in terms of the two kinds of images presented in the Sophist. While all speech is imagistic, some can elevate their status, namely when they become eikon-type images. With this as a clue, I turn to the Sophist target passage and argue that first, the communion of Kinds employs the method of hypothesis by applying it to Forms and investigating what statements are consistent and inconsistent with the Forms posited; second, logos has the character of image at the level of words, sentences, and relationships between sentences; finally, the Stranger’s introduction of partaking-language is meant to overcome the limitations of logos and create eikones that can serve as originals. The second point can be observed as the arguments proceed in increasing complexity, and I provide evidence for the first in 254d-255e, and show how the final point is illustrated in 256a-e. The above results bring me to a close by reflecting on what kind of philosophical illumination is achieved by this juxtaposition of the two dialogues. I suggest, on the one hand, that the Sophist passage explains why the method of hypothesis is said by Socrates to be second best. It is second best because the arguments might be based on insufficient insight, cannot reveal the nature of each Form by itself, and they might be misinterpreted. On the other hand, the Sophist also shows that the method of hypothesis, while safer than perhaps other methods of inquiry, is not fully safe: its very procedure risks falling prey to sophistry.