Two Kinds of Truth and Falsehood in Plato’s Sophist
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The sophist is confused with a philosopher or politician and shows various aspects, making it difficult to define him with a unique technique. For example, Noburu Notomi interprets the sophist as a person who imitates God who is truly wise but produces apparitions, not likenesses of God. On the other hand, Jonathan Beere interprets the sophist as a person who imitates the appearance of the philosopher’s belief system in a deceptive way. And both define the sophist as a person who uses false elenchus using false contradictions. However, neither of these interpretations adequately explains that elenchus shows the presence or absence of its objects’ wisdom, not its users’ wisdom. And that the dialectic was directly mentioned and detailed as a philosopher’s knowledge or technique. In addition, these interpretations provide insufficient explanations for how the original, the likeness, and the apparition are distinguished and related to each other. However, one can supplement these two interpretations by distinguishing between truth/falsehood established in the relationship between the original and the image (including both the likeness and the apparition) and true/false established in the relationship between the likeness and the apparition, using Michael Frede’s interpretation that being has two different usages (in itself, is1; in relation to the other, is2). Through this interpretation, the philosopher as the original and the imitator as the likeness of the philosopher are distinguished from each other, and again, sophist as an apparitional philosopher is distinguished from both the philosopher and the likeness of him. In addition, only the last of the seven descriptions on the sophist defines him in is1 usage, and the rest describes him in is2 use. And the belief in confusing the sophist as a philosopher or politician turns out to be both an apparition and a false opinion of the sophist.
Abstract
The sophist is confused with a philosopher or politician and shows various aspects, making it difficult to define him with a unique technique. For example, Noburu Notomi interprets the sophist as a person who imitates God who is truly wise but produces apparitions, not likenesses of God. On the other hand, Jonathan Beere interprets the sophist as a person who imitates the appearance of the philosopher’s belief system in a deceptive way. And both define the sophist as a person who uses false elenchus using false contradictions. However, neither of these interpretations adequately explains that elenchus shows the presence or absence of its objects’ wisdom, not its users’ wisdom. And that the dialectic was directly mentioned and detailed as a philosopher’s knowledge or technique. In addition, these interpretations provide insufficient explanations for how the original, the likeness, and the apparition are distinguished and related to each other. However, one can supplement these two interpretations by distinguishing between truth/falsehood established in the relationship between the original and the image (including both the likeness and the apparition) and true/false established in the relationship between the likeness and the apparition, using Michael Frede’s interpretation that being has two different usages (in itself, is1; in relation to the other, is2). Through this interpretation, the philosopher as the original and the imitator as the likeness of the philosopher are distinguished from each other, and again, sophist as an apparitional philosopher is distinguished from both the philosopher and the likeness of him. In addition, only the last of the seven descriptions on the sophist defines him in is1 usage, and the rest describes him in is2 use. And the belief in confusing the sophist as a philosopher or politician turns out to be both an apparition and a false opinion of the sophist.
참고문헌 (11)
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