Plato’s Perfect Sophist: The Clarification Inferred
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This paper, examining the languages and the methods of division to clarify a sophist by Plato, suggests that a possible clarification of the perfect sophist in a positive sense can be inferred from the divisions, and that such sophist would be necessary for Plato’s project of practicality of philosophy. In clarifying a sophist Plato presents various forms of the sophist in the Sophist. In the final division of the sophist, Plato divides apparition-making and likeness-making in image-making (Soph. 235b-236c); apparition-making with knowledge and that with a belief (but without knowledge) in imitating (267a-e); again, believing to know (sincere) and pretending to know while believing not to know (insincere) in imitating with a belief (266e-268a); finally, words-giving publicly and words-giving privately in pretending to know while imitating with a belief (268a-c). When one who, as an imitator, practices ‘words-giving privately’ is suggested as the sophist, Plato concludes that ‘it seems likely to be true if the real sophist is said to be one who, being insincere, performs the imitative kind of the contrary-word-making on the basis of a belief, of the apparition-making in image-making to produce a marvelous part in words concerning human matters’ (268c-d). Since the methods of division to clarify the sophist runs in a non-exclusive way, however, it does not seem impossible for the sophist to be one with knowledge. Imitating by words-giving privately with knowledge thus can be inferred to lie under likeness-making. Here, one who knows, if making likeness in words from imitating what one knows, is considered the perfect sophist who produces images to form a correct belief in the soul, without violating the clarifications of the sophist. Such perfect sophist is not only working positively but also necessary in practicality of philosophy to establish the common good in a community, as the sophist surely aids people to equip their souls with the knowledge-like beliefs or the beliefs that bear the correct proportions same as knowledge, when they are by the nature of soul incapable of reaching and acquiring knowledge.
Abstract
This paper, examining the languages and the methods of division to clarify a sophist by Plato, suggests that a possible clarification of the perfect sophist in a positive sense can be inferred from the divisions, and that such sophist would be necessary for Plato’s project of practicality of philosophy. In clarifying a sophist Plato presents various forms of the sophist in the Sophist. In the final division of the sophist, Plato divides apparition-making and likeness-making in image-making (Soph. 235b-236c); apparition-making with knowledge and that with a belief (but without knowledge) in imitating (267a-e); again, believing to know (sincere) and pretending to know while believing not to know (insincere) in imitating with a belief (266e-268a); finally, words-giving publicly and words-giving privately in pretending to know while imitating with a belief (268a-c). When one who, as an imitator, practices ‘words-giving privately’ is suggested as the sophist, Plato concludes that ‘it seems likely to be true if the real sophist is said to be one who, being insincere, performs the imitative kind of the contrary-word-making on the basis of a belief, of the apparition-making in image-making to produce a marvelous part in words concerning human matters’ (268c-d). Since the methods of division to clarify the sophist runs in a non-exclusive way, however, it does not seem impossible for the sophist to be one with knowledge. Imitating by words-giving privately with knowledge thus can be inferred to lie under likeness-making. Here, one who knows, if making likeness in words from imitating what one knows, is considered the perfect sophist who produces images to form a correct belief in the soul, without violating the clarifications of the sophist. Such perfect sophist is not only working positively but also necessary in practicality of philosophy to establish the common good in a community, as the sophist surely aids people to equip their souls with the knowledge-like beliefs or the beliefs that bear the correct proportions same as knowledge, when they are by the nature of soul incapable of reaching and acquiring knowledge.
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