Probability Approaches to Conditionals
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This paper seeks to show what the concept of conditional probability can do and how it is best incorporated in explaining conditionals with main reference to Jackson (1987) and Edington (1995, 2003). Probability approaches to conditionals are able to distinguish probable conditionals from improbable conditionals. In addition to this, Jackson's approach, which employs the truth functional calculus of material conditional approach, also predicts the truth value of conditionals having false antecedents, while the ones which don't incorporate the material conditional of propositional logic cannot. Both of them have problems with conditionals containing false antecedents: the former cannot say anything about their assertibility; the latter doesn't provide them with interpretations. The former, utilizing conditional probability as the criterion to determine assertibility of conditionals, has a serious problem with clarifying the concept of assertibility due to the fact that asserting is eventually a behaviour and that assertion of a conditional cannot be rightly identified with its conditional probability.
Abstract
This paper seeks to show what the concept of conditional probability can do and how it is best incorporated in explaining conditionals with main reference to Jackson (1987) and Edington (1995, 2003). Probability approaches to conditionals are able to distinguish probable conditionals from improbable conditionals. In addition to this, Jackson's approach, which employs the truth functional calculus of material conditional approach, also predicts the truth value of conditionals having false antecedents, while the ones which don't incorporate the material conditional of propositional logic cannot. Both of them have problems with conditionals containing false antecedents: the former cannot say anything about their assertibility; the latter doesn't provide them with interpretations. The former, utilizing conditional probability as the criterion to determine assertibility of conditionals, has a serious problem with clarifying the concept of assertibility due to the fact that asserting is eventually a behaviour and that assertion of a conditional cannot be rightly identified with its conditional probability.
참고문헌 (15)
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