왕부지 · 이토 진사이(伊藤仁齋) · 정약용의 인물성동이(人物性同異)에 관한 비교연구 -『중용』 ‘천명지위성(天命之謂性)’장과 『맹자』 ‘생지위성(生之謂性)’장을 중심으로-

Abstract

This study focused on their interpretations of the chapter titled Tianming-Zhi-Wei-Xing in Zhongyong and Sheng-Zhi-Wei-Xing in Mencius. The primary aim was to discover the ideological features of Wang Fuzhi, Ito Jinsai, and Jeong Yak-yong by examining the common grounds and differences that the identified problems exhibit in the In-mul-seong-dong theory. In terms of Rénwù xìng yì (人物性異, Character heterogeneity), found in the Tianming-Zhi-Wei-Xing chapter in Zhongyong, we observed differences in Fuzhi, Jinsai, and Jeong’s interpretations. Zhu Xi argued that the morality of Jiàn shùn wǔcháng (健順五常) can be found in all animals, just like in human beings. On this, Fuzhi thought and emphasized that humanhood and animalhood are different. Further, animalhood implies perceiving animals from a human being’s perspective instead of considering the innate qualities of animals themselves per se. Jinsai claimed that dogs and chicken cannot wield Shan Dao (善道) and Shan Jiao (善敎) in spite of their acquisition of these qualities, whereas human beings could practice Dao (道) and make use of Shan Jiao (善敎) due to their good nature of Xing (性). Jeong criticised Zhu Xi for claiming that humans and animals acquired the virtues of Jiàn shùn wǔcháng (健順五常), even when human being’s Rényì lǐ zhì ( 仁義禮智) was not attributed by heaven. Both Fuzhi, Jinsai, and Jeong shared three common grounds in their understanding of Rénwù-Xìng-Yì. First, they rejected Zhu Xi’s combination of Sex and Dao with human beings and animals, but they argued that Sex and Dao are just rénxìng (人性) and réndào (人道). Second, as far as Xiūdào zhī jiào (修道之敎) is concerned, they emphasized the importance of educating human beings about morality since they limited the Xing and Dao to the category of rénxìng (人性). Third, they did not accept the universality of Lǐ (理) in Lǐ tóng qì yì (理同氣異), which is central to Zhu Xi’s understanding of Rénwù xìng yì (人物性異). However, they emphasized the distinctiveness of Rénwù xìng yì. In the chapter Sheng-Zhi-Wei-Xing in Mencius, Fuzhi saw that humanhood and animalhood are different in such a way that human beings possess good qì (氣), and hence, their Xing (性) is of good nature. In contrast, animals possess vicious qì (氣), and hence, the nature of their Xing (性) is vicious, suggesting the privation of morality in their nature. In distinguishing Rénwù-Xìng-Yì, Jinsai suggested that the temperament of humans and that of dogs and cows are different. Jeong argued that human beings’ sex is the combination of sex in morality and temperament, whilst the innate sex of animals is sex in temperament alone. Zhu Xi established a theoretical system that uniformly explains and does not distinguish humans and nature with the two concepts of Li and Chi. However, the common characteristics of Wang Fuzhi, Ito Jinsai, and Jeong Yak-yong are that they separate humans and nature and exclude nature from their system of ethics. In particular, Wang Fuzhi and Jeong Yak-yong re-defined humans as the only beings to rule and utilize beasts and vegetation. The reason why the three scholars have different views on the “divergent theory on the nature of humans and things (人物性異論)” in the 17th and 18th centuries can be seen as a standpoint formed from the perspective of Korean, Chinese, and Japanese Confucian studies in East Asia; it criticizes and supplements the “theory of the difference between human and animal nature (人物性同論)” based on Zhu Xi’s fundamental position of “one ruler over many things.” The three scholars clearly revealed that human nature and the nature of things cannot be fundamentally alike, and their works should be reconstructed by establishing their respective “theories on the different natures of humans and things (人物性異)” from the perspective of humans as good-natured and marvelous.