맹자의 내면화기획을 통한 유학윤리 정초 — ‘義’개념을 중심으로 —

Abstract

Mencius' greatest achievement is that he accepted the problem that Confucius had not raised before to defend the beliefs of Confucian as his own task, and he carried out the theoretical work on it. And the concept of yi 義 successfully supports Mencius's moral internalization project, which is declared as the proposition xing shen 性善. He describes the origin of morality and the process in which it is expressed, and xiu e zhi xin 羞惡之心 shows the hao ran zhi qi 浩然之氣 as a belief consciousness, and is the best step in terms of internalization of value. And all of them are serving to strengthen their inner self in the concept of yi to establish moral theory. The philosophical significance of the controversy over Gaozi is that the source and ability to do moral behavior of those expressed as yi is inherent in the mind. Now the object of interest is not the external structure but the mind of the subject who thinks and acts. Until now, yi which gave the basis of the act in the relationship with the human being became the internal morality and turned into the problem that the subject should be aware and realized. The second question raised the question of what we could define as morality, and suggested that the morals that the controversy with Gaozi is implicit are not the problems of the form of conduct, but that they should come from the heart and be able to approve in the mind. However, this aspect has the problem that there is always the possibility of discrepancy and conflict between subjective and internal morality and objective and external normative ethics.