회생이후 경영자교체여부에 따른 이익조정
The Earnings Management based on CEO Turnover after the Reorganized
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초록
본 연구의 목적은 M&A를 통한 회생기업은 경영자교체를 겪게 되는데, 이러한 경영자교체가 이익조정에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 살펴보았다. 이를 검증하기 위하여 실물활동을 통한 이익조정여부는 Zang(2007)과 Cohen and Zarowin(2008)의 연구에서 사용한 실물활동 통합 측정치(REM;real earnings management proxy)를 추정하여 검증하였다. 그리고 발생액 이익조정은 수정 Jones의 모형을 개선한 성과조정모형(Kothari et al. 2005)을 이용하여 검증하였다. 본 연구의 중요한 분석결과는 최고경영자가 교체연도에 각각의 비정상적인 영업활동, 비정상적인 생산원가, 비정상적 판매비와 광고비를 통해 이익조정을 하는 것과는 관련이 없는 것으로 나타났으나, REM과는 통계적으로 유의한 영향이 있는 것으로 나타났다. 그러나 발생액을 통한 이익조정과는 관련성이 없는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 공헌점은 첫째 M&A를 통해서 회생한 기업들 중 특히 교체된 경영자는 실물활동을 통한 이익조정을 할 수 있고, 이것이 회생기업의 성과에 영향을 줄 수 있다는 것을 제시한 점이다. 둘째 자본시장에서 다양한 이해관계집단은 회생기업의 재무제표 정보에 대해 환기가 필요함이 요구된다. 셋째 M&A를 통한 회생기업에서 경영자교체의 의미를 신중하게 검토할 수 있는 계기가 되었다는 것이다.
Abstract
This study examines the empirical evidence on earnings management associated with CEO changed using real earnings management and discretionary accrual. The samples are consisted of non-banking firms listed on KRX from 2001 to 2012. The major implications of this research are as follows. First, abnormal operating activities(A-CFO), abnormal production costs(A-Prod) and abnormal selling and advertising costs(A-SGA) appeared to be unrelated CEO changed. however REM meaured by Zang(2007)& Cohen and Zarowin(2008)showed statistically positive values at 10% significant level in the year in which CEO changed. Thus our empirical First-hypothesis is accepted. Second, DA in the year in which CEO changed not showed statistically significant. therefore Second-hypothesis is rejected. This paper contributes to the existing earnings management literature. First, CEO turnover influence earnings management using real earnings management. The evidence obtained here in suggests the need for more rigid screening for financial statement around CEO changed in Reorganized firm through M&A. Second, the results in this paper provide an important implication for diverse interest groups participating in the CEO turnover of Reorganization Company. Third, I think that the opportunity to carefully consider the implications of replacing managers in The Reorganized firm through M&A.
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